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Decentralization is often advocated as a means of improving local 
democracy and enhancing what economists call allocative efficiency. In 
federal countries, where power is already divided between national and 
state governments, decentralization involves the devolution of power from 
state to local governments. The world’s largest federal country, India, took 
an unusual step to advance decentralization: it passed the 74th 
Constitutional Amendment Act to confer constitutional status on 
municipalities. However, India’s efforts to promote the devolution of power 
through a national urban renewal scheme have not succeeded for three 
reasons. The first is that India’s decentralization process is incomplete. 
Political decentralization has been stymied by the language of the 
constitutional amendment itself; administrative decentralization has been 
hampered by the comparative advantage of entrenched state-level 
institutions; and fiscal decentralization has not occurred because financial 
responsibility—but not significant revenue—has been devolved. The second 
reason is that decentralization has been undertaken in a top-down manner, 
which has exacerbated Center-state relations and mitigated the goal of 
allocative efficiency. Third is the relative weakness of local governance 
structures, which has created a Catch-22 situation: as long as the local 
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governments lack significant capacity, the states are reluctant to devolve 
power to them. Additional effort needs to be directed towards an effective 
model of cooperative federalism. With Prime Minister Narendra Modi 
poised to create “smart cities” and promote urban renewal, it is critical to 
understand why India’s prior decentralization efforts have largely failed. 
The lessons learned over the past decade are an important guide to the 
future of cities in India as well as in other federal countries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Cities are our future. They are engines of economic growth, channels 
for public participation, and vehicles for improving public services and 
quality of life. As of 2014, more than half of the world’s population now 
lives in cities.1 Greater decentralization of power to cities is often promoted 
as a way to bring decisions closer to the people,2 thereby improving local 
democracy and enhancing what economists call allocative efficiency, i.e. 
the matching of services to local preferences.3 But cities are not 
autonomous legal actors; rather, in federal countries, their authority usually 
derives from state governments. As a result, the increased devolution of 
power to the local level can create tension with the states and highlight 
existing constitutional imbalances of power between the state and national 
governments. 
Projected to have the fastest rate of urbanization in coming years, 
India represents an important case study for understanding the legal 
landscape in which cities are situated.4 A federal country,5 India took the 
unusual step of amending its constitution to give distinct constitutional 
status to municipalities. In 1992, the government of India passed the 74th 
Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA), which formally recognized urban 
 
 1. U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, U.N. 
Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/366, at xxi (2014); Somini Sengupta, U.N. Finds Most People Now Live in Cities, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/11/world/more-than-half-the-global-
population-growth-is-urban-united-nations-report-finds.html. 
 2. See, e.g., GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, LOCAL GOVERNANCE: AN 
INSPIRING JOURNEY INTO THE FUTURE i (2007), http://arc.gov.in/6-1.pdf (examining the “need for real 
democratic decentralisation in the country in order to usher in genuine grass roots democracy”); P.K. 
MOHANTY ET AL., MUNICIPAL FINANCE IN INDIA: AN ASSESSMENT 1 (2007), http://saiindia.gov.in/ 
english/Members_Area/Public_Financial/Courseware%20Session%20Wise/SEssion%2018%20Munici
pal%20Finance/Municipal%20Finance%20in%20India.pdf (“The Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 
1992 has mandated grassroot level democracy in urban areas . . . .”). 
 3. Kyoko Kuwajima, Health Sector Management and Governance in Thailand, in ASIAN 
DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE VOL. 2: THE ROLE OF GOVERNANCE IN ASIA 190, 248 n.57 (Yasutami 
Shimomura ed., 2004). 
 4. See K.C. Sivaramakrishnan, Revisiting the 74th Constitutional Amendment for Better 
Metropolitan Governance, 48 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 86, 86 (2013) (arguing that “Indian policymakers 
have been slow in responding to changing metropolitan forms and have largely visualised urbanisation 
as city expansion”). 
 5. India is sometimes described as a quasi-federal country, as will be discussed infra. See S.P. 
AIYAR, Competitive and Cooperative Trends in the Indian Federal System, in ESSAYS ON INDIAN 
FEDERALISM 114, 115 (S.P. Aiyar & Usha Mehta eds., 1965) (noting that Professr Wheare used the 
term “Quasi-federal” to deal with the “bewildering range of facts” present in the Indian system); V.G. 
Ramachandran, Aspects of Federalism, in ESSAYS ON INDIAN FEDERALISM 58 (S.P. Aiyar & Usha 
Mehta eds., 1965) (explaining that “‘quasi-federal’ is a misnomer and only means ‘virtually federal’”). 
 82 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol. 26:79 
local bodies.6 With this local-level empowerment came the opportunity to 
transform not only the way that citizens engaged with their government, 
but also the way that public services were delivered. But while this 
constitutional amendment was enacted over twenty years ago, only within 
the last decade has there been any real effort to implement these reforms in 
the urban sector. Despite a constitutional mandate and significant financial 
resources, the strengthening of municipalities has been difficult and the 
expected gains in democracy and public service delivery have not 
materialized. 
This is a critical moment for understanding why India’s efforts to 
decentralize power down to municipalities have met with only limited 
success. Buoyed by a landslide election in the summer of 2014 and a recent 
visit by U.S. President Barack Obama in January 2015, Indian Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi is poised to launch a series of programs designed 
to create modern cities that can foster economic growth. For example, India 
will soon be receiving U.S. support for the construction of three “smart 
cities,”7 which among other things, should be able to provide good 
infrastructure such as water, sanitation, reliable utility services, and health 
care.8 Modi’s election also signaled the conclusion of the Jawaharlal Nehru 
National Urban Renewal Mission (JnNURM), India’s flagship urban 
renewal program, which was created under the previous administration in 
2005. Prime Minister Modi has since replaced the JnNURM with his own 
urban renewal scheme, the Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban 
Transformation (AMRUT), which continues to tie urban renewal to 
decentralization.9 The lessons learned over the past decade are an important 
guide to the future of cities in India as well as in other federal countries. 
 
 6.  The term “urban local bodies” (ULBs) is generally used by the government of India because 
there are three tiers of urban local bodies. In this article, the term “municipalities” or “cities” is used. 
The distinctions are not relevant for the purposes of this article because power can be devolved to any 
of the municipal bodies. See K.C. Sivaramakrishnan, Judicial Setback for Panchayats and Local 
Bodies, 45 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 43, 45–46 n.5 (2010). India also passed the 73rd Constitutional 
Amendment Act in 1992, which paved the way for greater decentralization of power to rural local 
bodies, known as panchayats. 
 7.  Obama in India: US, India Sign Pact for Developing Smart Cities in Ajmer, Allahabad & 
Visakhapatnam, ECON. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2015), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-01-
25/news/58433367_1_smart-cities-mous-agreements. 
 8.  Draft Concept Note on Smart City Scheme 4 (Smart City Council, Working Paper, 2014), 
http://india.smartcitiescouncil.com/system/tdf/india/public_resources/Concept-Note-on-Smart-City 
Scheme_0.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=2229. 
 9.  PM’s Remarks at the Launch of AMRUT, Smart Cities Mission and Housing for All (Urban), 
PMINDIA NEWS UPDATES (June 25, 2015), http://pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pms-remarks-at-the-
launch-of-amrut-smart-cities-mission-and-housing-for-all-urban/ [hereinafter PM’s Remarks]. 
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As the role of cities becomes increasingly important in our global 
economy, this paper highlights how constitutional design and history can 
impede the effective decentralization of power. With an analysis that draws 
on the legal, political economy, and urban planning literature, this article 
points to three key reasons that may explain why decentralization in India 
has not led to the expected gains in municipal empowerment and 
effectiveness. The first is the partial nature of India’s decentralization. 
Service delivery improvements are more likely to occur when political, 
administrative, and fiscal decentralization are pursued simultaneously. In 
India, the language of the constitutional amendment itself has stymied 
political decentralization, the comparative advantage of entrenched state-
level institutions has hampered administrative decentralization, and fiscal 
decentralization has not occurred because financial responsibility, but not 
significant revenue, has been devolved to municipalities. The second 
reason is that decentralization in India has been top-down. Priority-setting 
at the national level mitigates the supposed allocative efficiency of 
decentralization, whereby decision-making is brought closer to the people. 
Moreover, this approach has exacerbated relations with the states, which 
often perceive national efforts to empower local bodies as a means of 
undermining state power. The third factor is the relative weakness of local 
governance structures, which has created a Catch-22 situation. 
Decentralization aims to empower local governments, but as long as local 
governments lack significant capacity, states will be reluctant to devolve 
power to them. In order for decentralization to succeed, more effort needs 
to be directed towards an effective model of cooperative federalism. 
The article begins with Indian constitutional history, outlining in 
Section I the key elements of the 74th CAA, which gave constitutional 
status to municipalities. Section I not only probes the underlying rationales 
for the 74th CAA, but also situates India’s experience in the context of 
broader economic and political theories of decentralization and 
subsidiarity. A global survey of cases examining the impact of 
decentralization makes clear that there are many aspects to 
decentralization—and how it is implemented is critical. 
Section II explores the rise of urban India. For decades, India’s 
policies towards cities echoed Mahatma Gandhi’s famous remark that 
“India lives in its villages.” Therefore, urban planning failed to keep step 
with migration to cities, resulting in poor public services and the 
proliferation of slums. Recognizing that urban areas are engines of future 
economic growth, India launched a massive urban renewal program in 
2005 to improve service infrastructure and rehabilitate slums in major 
cities. The JnNURM marked a seismic shift in policy not only because it 
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sought to promote urban renewal, but because it simultaneously promoted 
local governance reforms. It breathed life into the 74th CAA, which had 
been adopted over a decade earlier in 1992. Though the JnNURM created 
the potential for greater decentralization, it ultimately achieved only limited 
success. 
Section III analyzes the roadblocks that India has faced in its efforts to 
decentralize power to the municipal level. Its sub-sections address, in turn, 
various barriers to achieving political, administrative, and fiscal 
decentralization. As discussed in Section III.A, states can, but are not 
required to, devolve power to municipalities under the 74th CAA. States 
are often reluctant to do so because they perceive municipal empowerment 
as a reduction of their own power vis-à-vis the central government. 
Section III.B traces the limited success of India’s efforts at 
administrative decentralization to municipalities’ lack of capacity and 
technical expertise. Because many public services are already delivered 
through state-level organizations (known as parastatals), states are hesitant 
to devolve responsibility to entities that are unprepared and untested. 
Finally, Section III.C suggests that fiscal decentralization has not 
occurred because the devolution of financial responsibility has not been 
accompanied by a sizeable increase in municipalities’ revenues. Instead, 
municipalities have been encouraged to diversify their funding bases and to 
tap into new revenue sources. But doing so is challenging in practice and 
contradicts the theoretical efficiency gains associated with a fiscal federal 
system. 
The analysis highlights the critical need for effective cooperative 
federalism in India. The top-down, highly centralized way in which 
decentralization has been implemented has exacerbated the relationship 
between the national government and the states. But because the central 
government must work through the states to devolve power and funds to 
municipalities, the states’ support is vital. Historically, India’s strong 
central government has successfully wielded the power of the purse to 
implement its own policies. As a result, India’s national urban renewal 
mission tied the delivery of municipal improvement funds to mandatory 
reforms at the local and state levels without the necessary level of state 
consultation and support. If India truly seeks to realize the promise of 
decentralization envisioned by the constitutional amendment made over 
two decades ago, the nation needs to develop a more efficient and 
cooperative model of federalism. The future of cities requires it. 
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL EMPOWERMENT OF CITIES IN INDIA 
A.  India’s 74th Constitutional Amendment Act Paves the Way for 
Decentralization 
India is not only the world’s largest democracy, but the world’s largest 
federal country.10 Constitutionally asymmetric, the national government of 
India is a union of twenty-nine states11 and seven Union territories.12 
Article 246 of India’s Constitution (Seventh Schedule) contains three 
lists—a Union List, a State List, and a Concurrent List—that delineate the 
powers of each level of government.13 Notably, power over matters not 
enumerated in the State or Concurrent Lists are reserved to the central 
government.14 As a result, India’s central government holds residual 
powers and has overriding authority in areas subject to the Concurrent List, 
where there is overlapping jurisdiction.15 India’s national government is 
officially a “union” government, but is frequently referred to as the 
“central” government because the national government wields significant 
power as compared to the states.16 
 
 10.  See Herman Bakvis & William M. Chandler, Federalism and Comparative Analysis, in 
FEDERALISM AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE 3, 5 (Herman Bakvis & William M. Chandler eds., 1987). 
 11.  The number of states in India’s federation has increased in recent years as large states split. 
For example, in June 2014, India created yet another new state, Telangana, which was carved out of 
Andhra Pradesh. See New State of Telangana is Born in Southern India, BBC NEWS (June 2, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-27658817. 
 12.  SHARADA RATH, FEDERALISM TODAY 19 (1984); Rekha Saxena, Is India a Case of 
Asymmetrical Federalism?, 47 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 70, 71 (2012), http://www.unifr.ch/federalism 
network/assets/files/tpl/forum_uploads/Rekha%20EPW%20ARTICLE%20ON%20ASYMMETRICAL
%20FEDERALISM.pdf (noting that given the presence of the Union territories and the unique status of 
Jammu and Kashmir, India’s Constitution is constitutionally asymmetric, a term that refers to the 
differing size and power of the governmental subunits). 
 13.  INDIA CONST. art. 246. 
 14.  INDIA CONST. Seventh Schedule, List I, ¶ 97. 
 15.  PRATIBHA AGARWAL, FISCAL FEDERALISM IN INDIA: IMPACT OF UNION TRANSFERS ON 
STATE FINANCES 38 (2012); P.K. Chaubey, Evolution of Union-State Fiscal Relations in India: Two 
Steps Forward and One Step Backward, in FISCAL FEDERALISM IN INDIA 21, 21 (P.K. Chaubey ed., 
2003) [hereinafter Chaubey, Union-State Fiscal Relations]; see also Debes Mukhopadhayay, Centre-
State Financial Relations in India: An Account of Major Debates, in FISCAL FEDERALISM IN INDIA, 
supra, at 55, 57 (noting that “the Indian Constitution exhibits ‘a federation with a strong centralizing 
tendency’” (citation omitted)). 
 16.  A federal country, India is a union of quasi-sovereign states that are guaranteed certain 
powers under the Constitution. India’s national government is frequently referred to as the “central” 
government, which illustrates the centralized nature of India’s federal structure and the power that the 
national government wields vis-à-vis the states. See P.K. Chaubey, Federalism in India: An 
Introduction, in FISCAL FEDERALISM IN INDIA, supra note 15, at 1, 3–4 [hereinafter Chaubey, 
Federalism in India] (noting the “[o]ver-centralisation of Federal Structure” and that the government of 
India is “de jure the Union Government but de facto the Central Government”). 
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In 1992, the Indian government passed the 73rd and 74th 
Constitutional Amendment Acts (CAA), which gave constitutional status to 
rural and urban local bodies, known as panchayats and municipalities, 
respectively.17 This unique feature of India’s Constitution is absent from 
some other federations such as the United States, Canada, and Australia.18 
The amendments to India’s Constitution were codified in Article 243.19 
Until that point, local governments in India were created by virtue of the 
“ultra vires” principle,20 and, therefore, their governance was left to the 
discretion of states.21 
The 74th CAA’s passage marked the first time that urban local bodies 
received constitutional recognition.22 The 74th CAA defines municipalities; 
provides a vehicle for devolving significant administrative powers, 
responsibilities, and sources of revenue to municipalities;23 and lays out a 
democratic governance framework in which municipalities should 
operate.24 Specifically, the 74th CAA mandates the creation of three tiers of 
 
 17.  Rural local bodies in India are referred to as panchayats raj. For a discussion of judicial 
review of constitutional amendments, see e.g., SUDHIR KRISHNASWAMY, DEMOCRACY AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INDIA: A STUDY OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE xviii (2009) (“A 
significant part of the academic and popular criticism of judicial activism of the Supreme Court is 
directed to the courts’ use of the basic structure doctrine to review constitutional amendments . . . much 
of this criticism emerges from a failure to adequately map the contours of constitutional judicial review 
as practised in the courts today.”). 
 18.  Roger Gibbins, Local Governance and Federal Political Systems, 53 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 163, 
164 (2001) (noting that municipal governments receive no explicit mention in the constitutions of 
Canada, the United States, and Australia). 
 19.  See INDIA CONST. art. 243, amended by The Constitution (Seventy-Third Amendment) Act, 
1992 (dedicating article 243–243O to panchayats); INDIA CONST. art. 243, amended by The 
Constitution (Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992 (dedicating article 243P–ZG to municipalities). 
 20.  The term “ultra vires” means “beyond the scope of power allowed or granted . . . by law.” 
Ultra vires, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 21.  Gov’t of India Second Admin. Reforms Comm’n, supra note 2, at 13; Nat’l Inst. of Urban 
Affairs, Impact of the Constitution (74th amendment) Act on the Working of Urban Local Bodies vi 
(2005), http://www.niua.org/research_studies_2006.asp. 
 22.  Gavin Shatkin & Sanjeev Vidyarthi, Introduction: Contesting the Indian City: Global Visions 
and the Politics of the Local, in CONTESTING THE INDIAN CITY: GLOBAL VISIONS AND THE POLITICS OF 
THE LOCAL 1, 10 (Gavin Shatkin ed., 2014). In contrast, rural local bodies, known as panchayats, were 
recognized as “units of self-government” in India’s original constitution. See, e.g., INDIA CONST. 1949 
art. 40 (“The State shall take steps to organise village panchayats and endow them with such powers 
and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government.“). 
 23.  INDIA CONST. art. 243W–243ZG, amended by The Constitution (Seventy-Fourth 
Amendment) Act, 1992 (setting forth municipalities’ specific functions and responsibilities). 
 24.  David Savage & Shubhagato Dasgupta, Governance Framework for Delivery of Urban 
Services, in INDIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT 42, 43 (2006) (identifying salient features of the 74th 
CAA); Shatkin & Vidyarthi, supra note 22, at 10; K.C. SIVARAMAKRISHNAN, POWER TO THE PEOPLE?: 
THE POLITICS AND PROGRESS OF DECENTRALISATION 132–45 (2000) (discussing history of how powers 
for municipalities evolved into the schedule). 
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local bodies, each made up of elected officials.25 In addition, the new 
constitutional provisions devolve greater functional responsibilities and 
financial powers to municipalities and require the creation of several 
administrative bodies to oversee deliberative planning, such as Wards 
Committees, District Planning Committees, and Metropolitan Planning 
Committees.26 State Finance Commissions were also created as vehicles for 
channeling money from the Central Finance Commission to the local 
bodies.27 With the goal of creating a more representative government at the 
local level, the 74th CAA also requires the regular and fair conduct of 
municipal elections and the reservation of seats for persons belonging to 
scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, backward classes, and women.28 
But while the 74th CAA provides a platform for empowering 
municipalities, it is important not to overstate their constitutional powers. 
The amendment does not automatically give local bodies autonomy. 
Rather, Article 243W gives states the discretion to devolve political, 
administrative, and fiscal power to municipalities.29 The Supreme Court of 
India underscored the discretionary nature of the states’ devolution power 
in the Ranga Reddy case, which involved the interpretation of analogous 
provisions for rural panchayats, under the Eleventh Schedule.30 Notably, 
even the dissenting justice, who otherwise argued that the states were 
obligated to devolve administrative powers, stated that because the 
Constitution did not devolve legislative or judicial authority, “[i]t is 
impermissible to characterize the Panchayats as the 3rd tier of the federal 
structure, under the Indian constitutional scheme even after the 73rd 
 
 25.  INDIA CONST. art. 243Q (using the term “Nagar Panchayat” to describe “an area in transition 
from rural area to urban area”; “Municipal Council” describes a “smaller urban area”; “Municipal 
Corporation” describes “larger urban area[s]”); Abhijit Datta, Municipal Reform in India: Comparative 
Models and Processes, 30 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2395, 2395 (1995). 
 26.  NAT’L INST. OF URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 21, at vi. 
 27.  See Sivaramakrishnan, supra note 24, at 167–71. 
 28.  INDIA CONST. art. 243T; GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, 
at 9; NAT’L INST. OF URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 21, at ix. 
 29.  Under Article 243W of the Constitution, “the Legislature of a State may, by law, endow” a 
municipality with any of the eighteen functions listed in the Twelfth Schedule of the Constitution.  
INDIA CONST. art. 243W; P.K. Mohanty, A Municipal Financing Framework, in URBANISATION IN 
INDIA: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THE WAY FORWARD 119, 123 (Isher Judge Ahluwalia et al. 
eds., 2014). 
 30.  See Ranga Reddy Dist. Sarpanches Ass’n v. Gov’t of Andhra Pradesh, (2004) 1 ALT 659, ¶ 6 
of the concurrence (“It is for the State Legislature to decide by expressing its will through legislation or 
subordinate legislation that to what extent the Panchayat Raj Institutions should be conferred with 
power and authority.” (Gupta, J., concurring)); Sivaramakrishnan, supra note 6, at 46 (disagreeing with 
the majority opinion, which “held that it was not obligatory on the part of a state government to assign 
functions” and agreeing with the dissent, which argued that this holding reduced key parts of the 
Constitution to “surplusage”). 
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amendment.”31 The same analysis would likely hold true for urban local 
bodies under the 74th CAA because the amendments are structurally 
similar. 
The Twelfth Schedule of the Constitution permits a state to devolve up 
to eighteen specified powers to a municipality, including: urban planning, 
regulating land-use, planning for economic and social development, 
alleviating urban poverty and upgrading slums, building roads and bridges, 
supplying water, and managing solid waste.32 The constitutional provision 
sets forth guideposts and outer limits on what powers may be devolved, 
stating that the municipalities should have “such powers and authority as 
may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self-
government,” but that their power may be restricted to “the preparation of 
plans for economic development and social justice” and “the performance 
of functions and the implementation of schemes as may be entrusted to 
them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Twelfth 
Schedule.”33 
These constitutional amendments represent an important formal shift 
in the distribution of power in India. If important political, administrative, 
and fiscal functions were actually devolved by states, then municipalities 
could realize the perceived benefits of decentralization, including the 
promotion of grassroots democracy and improved delivery of public 
services in urban areas. 
B.  Decentralization Theory Motivated India’s Constitutional Reforms 
The passage of the 74th CAA reflects India’s embrace of the theory of 
decentralization and the doctrine of subsidiarity, a principle of international 
law that reflects a preference for making decisions at the lowest possible 
level of government.34 Public functions are carried out at the lowest tier 
 
 31.  Ranga Reddy, 1 ALT at ¶¶ 20, 37, 60 of the dissent (Raghuram, J., dissenting). 
 32.  Mohanty, supra note 29, at 127 (classifying eighteen functions in Twelfth Schedule according 
to three functions: essentially municipal functions, agency functions, and shared or concurrent 
functions); Govinda Rao & Richard Bird, Governance and Fiscal Federalism, in URBANISATION IN 
INDIA: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THE WAY FORWARD, supra note 29, at 203, 211; MOHANTY 
ET AL., supra note 2, at ii (noting that a state can delegate an urban municipality to implement central or 
state government schemes). 
 33.  INDIA CONST. art. 243W. 
 34.  See Yishai Blank, Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role of Local Governments in an Age of 
Global Multilevel Governance, 37 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 509, 533 (2010) (“[S]ubsidiarity mandates that 
‘action should be taken at the lowest level of government at which particular objectives can adequately 
be achieved.’” (internal citation omitted)); Albert Breton et al., Decentralization and Subsidiary: 
Toward a Theoretical Reconciliation, 19 J. INT’L L. 21, 21–22 (1998) (“‘[S]ubsidiarity is the specific 
claim that the burden of proof in the process of making this trade-off [between the claims of 
decentralization and those of centralization] should lie in favour of decentralization,’ and ‘that when in 
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possible and delegated upwards only when smaller units of governance 
cannot perform the tasks effectively.35 Subsidiarity can only be achieved if 
there is effective decentralization, like that envisioned by the 74th CAA.36 
India’s reforms under the 74th CAA were largely motivated by the 
goal of political decentralization—a desire to bring government closer to 
the people and, thereby, provide more opportunities for civic participation 
and for the empowerment of local officials.37 In India, municipal 
empowerment through the principle of subsidiarity is perceived as a way to 
create greater “grassroot[s] . . . democracy”38 and more “citizen-centric[]”39 
government. It is also seen as a vehicle for providing citizens with a sense 
of ownership over government programs and giving them greater ability to 
participate in decision-making.40 Subsidiarity and decentralization have the 
potential in India to improve efficiency, enhance local self-reliance, spur 
competition, and promote innovation.41 
 
doubt, decentralization should be preferred.’”); Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle 
of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 41–42 (2003). The usage of this term goes 
as far back as ancient Greece, but it is strongly associated with the Catholic social theorists of the 
nineteenth century. One such theorist, Pius XI, defined subsidiarity as the principle that “[j]ust as it is 
gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own initiative and industry 
and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance 
of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can 
do.” Id. at 42 (quoting Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno: Encyclical Letter on Reconstruction of Social 
Order, in 3 THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 1903–1939, 428 (1931)). 
 35.  GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 14 (“The central idea 
of subsidiarity is that citizens as sovereigns and stake-holders in a democracy are the final decision-
makers.”). 
 36.  Id. at 15. 
 37.  K. Dharmarajan, Power to the People: 74th Amendment, in NAT’L INST. OF URBAN AFFAIRS, 
THE 74TH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT: POWER TO THE PEOPLE 63, 63 (1994)  (“The 74th 
Constitutional Amendment . . . seeks to provide constitutional recognition to the third-tier of the 
Government and bring political power closer to the people.”); K.C. SIVARAMAKRISHNAN, RE-
VISIONING INDIAN CITIES: THE URBAN RENEWAL MISSION 94–95 (2011) (“The 74th Constitutional 
Amendment has been acclaimed as a comprehensive prescription for empowerment of the ULBS.”). See 
generally SIVARAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 24. 
 38.  GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at i; MOHANTY ET AL., 
supra note 2, at 1. 
 39.  GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 13. 
 40.  Savage & Dasgupta, supra note 24, at 42 (“Recent years have witnessed an increasing interest 
in and growing consciousness of the need and importance of local self-government as a provider of 
services to the community as well as an instrument of democratic self-government.”). See generally 
Priyam Das, Decentralization and Citizen Participation in Urban Service Delivery in India: Is 
Institutionalizing Enough?, in DEMOCRATIC LOCAL GOVERNANCE: REFORMS & INNOVATIONS IN ASIA 
112, 122 (G. Shabbir Cheema ed., 2013). 
 41.  GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 14–16 ( “[I]f 
democracy is to be real and meaningful, the locus of power should shift as close to the citizen as 
possible in order to facilitate direct participation, constant vigil and timely intervention.”). 
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India’s approach is in line with broader political theory on 
decentralization, which suggests that by encouraging public participation, 
decentralization leads to governance that is more creative, responsible, and 
effective.42 For example, decentralization allows local administrators to test 
innovative ideas without justifying their adoption on a national scale.43 
Across the world, decentralization is a means for “democratic local 
governance,” which gives citizens and their elected local representatives 
more power in public decision-making.44 The rationale is that it is generally 
easier for the average citizen to gain access to local—as opposed to 
national—political forums. Local public participation has the advantage of 
highlighting gaps in basic service provision, which local leaders can then 
try to fix. Under certain situations, decentralization may also improve 
human rights outcomes, though this largely depends on the way in which 
decentralization efforts are implemented.45 
The promise of more effective outcomes has fueled the drive towards 
decentralized governance in India.46 As stated in the Twelfth Five Year 
Plan of India, “[t]he principle of subsidiarity is now well established in 
development literature across the world. The role of local governments in 
ensuring efficient and accountable delivery of basic services is now well 
 
 42.  Hans F. Illy, Decentralisation: A Worldwide Trend, in FEDERALISM AND 
DECENTRALISATION: CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS IN INDIA AND GERMANY 26, 30 (Gert W. Kueck et al. 
eds., 1998). 
 43.  Id. at 30–31. 
 44.  Harry Blair, Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic Local 
Governance in Six Countries, 28 WORLD DEV. 21, 21, 23–26 (2000), http://isites.harvard.edu/ 
fs/docs/icb.topic793411.files/Wk%205_Oct%201st/Blair_2000_Local%20Governance%20in%20Six%
20Countries.pdf; see also Nancy Thede, Decentralization, Democracy and Human Rights: A Human 
Rights-Based Analysis of the Impact of Local Democratic Reforms on Development, 10 J. HUM. DEV. & 
CAPABABILITIES 103, 104–05 (2009) (“[D]ecentralization as democratic reform . . . has been inspired 
by two separate logics: on the one hand, that of the pro-democracy movements in southern countries; 
and on the other, the governance reforms piloted by the international financial institutions (IFIs).”). 
 45.  See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), art. 21 
(stating in Article 21 that “[e]veryone has the right to take part in the government of [one’s] country”). 
But see INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, LOCAL RULE: DECENTRALISATION AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 19–21, 23–30, (2002), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/15C8B99E9E0E8 
85CC1257 50B00503166-ICHRP_Jan2002.pdf (finding that decentralization does not always lead to 
the increased realization of human rights, but that it is more likely to happen when the decentralization 
effort (1) “enhances political rights” (2) “leads to more effective government” (3) “helps to achieve 
economic and social rights” (4) “promotes accountability”, and (5) “increases local autonomy and 
empowers disadvantaged group[s]”). 
 46.  See GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at v (identifying core 
principles underpinning this agenda which include: “democratic decentralisation as the centre-piece of 
governance reforms in the country; the principle of subsidiarity which means that what can best be done 
at the lower levels of government should not be centralised at higher levels; a clear delineation of 
functions entrusted to the local bodies; effective devolution in financial terms and convergence of 
services for the citizens as well as citizens centric governance structures”). 
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understood.”47 A key premise of the 74th CAA is that “[l]ocal governments 
are ideally suited to provide services like water supply, solid waste 
management, sanitation, etc., as they are closer to the people and in a better 
position to appreciate their concerns and even economic principles state 
that such services are best provided at the level of government closest to 
the people.”48 Moreover, by giving citizens greater responsibility for the 
hard choices that need to be made,49 fiscal responsibility is expected to 
improve because people are better positioned to see the link between taxes 
and municipal resource generation and service outcomes.50 
Decentralization is expected to improve economic efficiency because 
of local government’s increased accountability to its citizens and better 
knowledge of their preferences. Devolution of certain tasks to local 
governments is often advocated on the grounds that it will lead to an 
improvement in “allocative efficiency” and “productive efficiency.” 
Allocative efficiency is defined as “better matching of public services to 
local needs,”51 while productive efficiency refers to the ability to produce a 
good at the lowest possible cost. The idea is that local officials are better 
positioned than central government officials to implement certain 
initiatives, provided that the effective coordination mechanisms are in 
place.52 Moreover, citizens can theoretically hold local officials 
accountable by “vot[ing] with their feet”— moving to states that offer the 
 
 47.  PLANNING COMM’N, GOV’T OF INDIA, TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN (2012-2017): FASTER, 
MORE INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH - VOLUME I 328 (2013), http://planning 
commission.gov.in/plans/planrel/12thplan/pdf/12fyp_vol1.pdf; see also HIGH POWERED EXPERT 
COMM. (HPEC) FOR ESTIMATING THE INV. REQUIREMENTS FOR URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE SERVS., 
REPORT ON INDIAN URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES 104 (2011), http://icrier.org/pdf/ 
FinalReport-hpec.pdf [hereinafter HPEC REPORT] (noting that the creation of institutions such as a 
Local Body Ombudsman can play a significant role in efforts to improve accountability). 
 48.  GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 10; see also 
THIRTEENTH FIN. COMM’N OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE THIRTEENTH FINANCE COMMISSION (2010–2015) 
149 (2009) (“Providing basic services at the grassroots level makes them the primary interface of the 
citizens’ interaction with the government. The principle of subsidiarity implies that matters are best 
handled by the least centralised competent authority. Following this, these institutions need to be 
adequately empowered—both functionally and financially—to enable them to fulfil the role envisaged 
for them in the Constitution.”). 
 49.  GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 14. 
 50.  Id. at 15. 
 51.  Kuwajima, supra note 3, at 192. 
 52.  See Illy, supra note 42, at 30 (“The efficiency of the central government could be increased 
through decentralisation by relieving top management officials of routine tasks that could be more 
effectively performed by field staff or local officials.”); Anand N. Asthana, Decentralisation, HRD and 
Production Efficiency of Water Utilities: Evidence from India, 14 WATER POL’Y 112, 112 (2012) 
(noting that in some cases decentralization is associated with the neglect of human resources 
development that ultimately lowers productive efficiency). 
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unique bundle of goods that they prefer.53 Decentralization is also expected 
to reduce bureaucracy and improve knowledge of local costs, all of which 
leads to higher levels of productive efficiency.54 
But research from around the world has highlighted situations in 
which the theoretical benefits of decentralization have not materialized. 
Decentralization does not always achieve its economic efficiency goals; 
rather, decentralization can exacerbate corruption55 and tax evasion.56 Nor 
does decentralization necessarily guarantee more responsible governance. 
Because citizens in poor countries lack resources, they cannot ensure that 
the bundle of services provided by their local government matches their 
preferences by “voting with their feet.”57 Additionally, local governments 
in poor countries may not be concerned about the departure of residents 
who are a perceived drain on resources.58 Indeed, even if residents were to 
move due to dissatisfaction with service delivery and local governments 
were to revise policy in response, “strong incentives to orient their policies 
toward more mobile groups” make it unlikely that the changes would 
 
 53.  Rao & Bird, supra note 32, at 205; Pranab Bardhan, Governance Issues in Delivery of Public 
Services, 13 J. AFR. ECONS. i167 (2004). 
 54.  Satu Kahkonen & Anthony Lanyi, Decentralization and Governance: Does Decentralization 
Improve Public Service Delivery?, PREM NOTES, June 2001, No. 55; see also Alfred P. Montero & 
David J. Samuels, The Political Determinants of Decentralization in Latin America: Causes and 
Consequences, in DECENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 3, 25–26 (Alfred P. 
Montero & David J. Samuels eds., 2004) (noting that the evidence of decentralization leading to 
increased accountability has been strong in the Latin American context); Iwan Barankay & Ben 
Lockwood, Decentralization and the Productive Efficiency of Government: Evidence from Swiss 
Cantons, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 1197, 1197 (2007), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S00472 
72706001654 (exploring the relationship between decentralization and productive efficiency). 
 55.  See generally Kilkon Ko & Hui Zhi, Fiscal Decentralization: Guilty of Aggravating 
Corruption in China?, 22 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 35, 35 (2013) (noting that fiscal decentralization can 
increase corruption if law enforcement is weak). See also Christian Lessman & Gunther Markwardt, 
One Size Fits All? Decentralization, Corruption, and the Monitoring of Bureaucrats, 38 WORLD DEV. 
631, 631 (2009) (finding that decentralization can increase corruption in countries in which press 
freedom is restricted). 
 56.  See Jan K. Brueckner, Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries: The Effects of Local 
Corruption and Tax Evasion, 1 ANNALS ECON. & FIN. 1, 1 (2000) (finding that the phenomena of local 
corruption and tax evasion did “indeed limit the benefits of fiscal decentralization”). 
 57.  Bardhan, supra note 53, at i168; See Rao & Bird, supra note 32, at 205. 
 58.  Omar Azfar et al., Political Disciplines on Local Government: Evidence from the Philippines, 
in DEVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT: GOVERNANCE PROSPECTS IN DECENTRALIZING STATES 197, 199 
(Mwangi S. Kimenyi & Patrick Meagher eds., 2004). The authors’ analysis focused on the Philippines, 
and they found that in this case, migration in response to service delivery offerings is fairly limited and 
instead seems to be mostly driven by unemployment. Id. The authors also note that even if citizens in 
developing countries are mobile, they likely will not be mobile enough to achieve the desired level of 
allocative efficiency. Id. 
 2015 CONSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENTS TO DECENTRALIZATION 93 
reflect the interests of all citizens.59 Additionally, allocative efficiency may 
not be achieved in countries with heterogeneous local communities because 
differences in preferences between two local communities may be too 
negligible.60 Finally, decentralization may be problematic in countries 
pursuing large scale redistributive policies because local governments may 
be particularly ill-suited to the task of redistribution.61 
Similarly, decentralization may not have the intended political impact 
of promoting participatory, grassroots democracy.62 A clear distinction 
exists between technical participation, which merely encourages “citizen 
voice,” and ensuring that the opinions of the poor and socially marginalized 
are heard by those in power.63 If local citizens disagree with the way that 
the local authority is managing a resource or service, it may be tempting for 
officials to assume that the community lacks knowledge or capacity.64 
While the poor or socially marginalized have more opportunities to 
publicly express their opinions, they may, nonetheless, have no more power 
in the decision-making process. Decentralized decision-making may be 
 
 59.  SEBASTIAN ECKARDT, ACCOUNTABILITY AND DECENTRALIZED SERVICE DELIVERY 49–50 
(2006). 
 60.  See, e.g., Jeff Dayton-Johnson, Determinants of Collective Action on the Local Commons: a 
Model with Evidence From Mexico, 62 J. DEV. ECON. 181, 181–82 (2000) (noting in a study on 
Mexican irrigation societies that more heterogeneous societies are likely to experience lower group 
performance and infrastructure maintenance); see also Melissa Leach, et al., Environmental 
Entitlements: Dynamics and Institutions in Community-Based Natural Resource Management, 27 
WORLD DEV. 225, 226 (1999) (critiquing the assumption often made in this literature about the 
existence of a relatively homogenous community that can be a subject of reform). 
 61.  See Amaresh Bagchi, Rethinking Federalism: Changing Power Relations Between the Center 
and the States, 33 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 21, 38 (2003), http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/content/33/ 
4/21.abstract (noting that there are “trade-offs” to delegating power to regional and local governments); 
see also Nirvikar Singh, Decentralization and Public Delivery of Health Care Services in India, 27 
HEALTH AFF. 991, 991–99 (2008) (suggesting that a failure to implement decentralization at the local 
level disadvantaged public health service delivery in the early 2000s). 
 62.  Das, supra note 40, at 114 (“Participation, however, has sometimes served to disenfranchise 
groups already marginalized by manufacturing consensus for policies that were created elsewhere and 
overlooking alternatives.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 63.  Richard Crook, Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction in Africa: The Politics of Local–
Central Relations, 23 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 77, 79 (2003), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ 
pad.261/abstract (internal citation omitted); see also Leach et al., supra note 60, at 228 (“[A]ll too often 
it is implied that the public airing of conflict is sufficient, and that social consensus and solidarity will 
necessarily result.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 64.  Jon Anderson, Four Considerations for Decentralized Forest Management: Subsidiarity, 
Empowerment, Pluralism, and Social Capital, in DECENTRALIZATION AND DEVOLUTION OF FOREST 
MANAGEMENT IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (T. Durst et al. eds., 2000) (“[F]orest services sometimes 
assume that because local groups do not agree with central expert authorities on how forests should be 
managed, that they must lack capacities or knowledge. Indeed, if local citizens disagree with the way 
that the local authority is managing a resource or service, it may be tempting for the officials to simply 
assume that the community lacks knowledge or capacity.”), http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x6898e/ 
x6898e02a.htm#P69_19234. 
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subject to elite capture, i.e., the misappropriation of resources by the 
community’s elite in order to serve their own interests, which may 
reproduce power structures.65 
Different forms of decentralization exist, including political, 
administrative, and fiscal decentralization, and much depends on the 
manner in which any given form is implemented.66 Partial decentralization 
may also stymie the intended benefits.67 For example, if the central 
government devolves some powers but retains control over others, local 
governments will be less able to respond to local preferences and the goal 
of allocative efficiency will not be achieved.68 
In the Indian context, decentralization has not achieved its promised 
benefits because—as the analysis below illustrates—decentralization has 
only been partially implemented. Moreover, while 74th CAA was passed in 
 
 65.  GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at iii (“[I]n situations of 
sharp local inequalities, decentralisation sometimes heightens the concentration of power, and 
discourages rather than fosters participation among the underprivileged. To illustrate, in some tribal 
areas where upper caste landlords and traders dominate village affairs, the devolution of power 
associated with the Panchayati Raj amendments has consolidated their hold and reinforced existing 
biases in the local power structure.”). See generally INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POL’Y, supra 
note 45, at 10 (noting that decentralization may undermine democracy by allowing local elites to 
capture the government, and emphasizing that in order for decentralization to be associated with human 
rights realization, participatory governance and accountable local governance need to be encouraged); 
Crook, supra note 63 (discussing empirical studies from Sub-Saharan Africa in which marginalized 
social groups have been the most excluded from the political process); Sanjay Kumar, Does 
“Participation” in Common Pool Resource Management Help the Poor? A Social Cost–Benefit 
Analysis of Joint Forest Management in Jharkhand, India, 30 WORLD DEV. 763 (2002), (finding that 
joint management of forests in India “reflects the social preference of the rural nonpoor”); Everisto 
Mapedza & Kim Geheb, Power Dynamics and Water Reform in the Zimbabwean Context: Implications 
for the Poor, 12 WATER POL’Y 517 (2010) (discussing a case study on the decentralization of the water 
sector in Zimbabwe where a new law led to more small-scale farmers attending local meetings, but the 
process was still driven, and in some instances manipulated, by commercial farmers who were 
economically better off); George Mathew, Panchayati Raj Institutions and Human Rights in India, 38 
ECON. & POL. WKLY. 155 (2003) (noting that evidence from rural India suggests that greater devolution 
of power to the Panchyati Raj has exacerbated inter-caste inequities, and in some cases, resulted in 
caste-related violence around local elections. For example, “[i]n Melavalavu [a village in Tamil Nadu], 
the dominant castes of the area murdered the panchayat president and the vice-president who both 
belonged to a lower caste, merely because they dared to fight the panchayat elections.”). 
 66.  Different Forms of Decentralization, THE WORLD BANK GRP., http://www1.worldbank.org/ 
publicsector/decentralization/what.htm#1 (last visited Sept. 24, 2015). 
 67.  Shantayanan Devarajan et al., The Politics of Partial Decentralization, in DOES 
DECENTRALIZATION ENHANCE SERVICE DELIVERY AND POVERTY REDUCTION? 102, 107 (Etisham 
Ahmad & Giorgio Brosio eds., 2009) (defining partial decentralization as “the situation when local 
governments are not held accountable for a complete set of budgetary allocations and their outcomes”). 
 68.  See generally Richard C. Crook, Four Years of the Ghana District Assemblies in Operation: 
Decentralization, Democratization and Administrative Performance, 14 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 339 
(1994), for the notion that local autonomy is achieved by allocating power in local government 
authority. 
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1992, it was not seriously implemented until the JnNURM, a massive 
scheme adopted in 2005 with twin goals: the improvement of urban 
infrastructure and basic services through a series of reforms designed to 
promote municipal empowerment.69 But the JnNURM faced a large hurdle: 
the continually deteriorating performance of municipalities.70 The next 
section considers the challenges facing urban India before exploring 
existing barriers to political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization. 
II. THE RISE OF URBAN INDIA 
A.  Urban Areas in India Were Historically Neglected 
“India lives in its villages.” Mahatma Gandhi’s famous phrase defined 
India for many decades and illustrates the historical bias against urban area 
development.71 To reduce urban migration, cities were not provided with 
much infrastructure or industrial support.72 However, the last two decades 
have seen a renewed interest in urban areas fueled by economic 
liberalization,73 recognition that cities are engines of growth, and 
decentralization trends.74 India will soon include some of the top-
performing, “growth-contributing” cities in the world.75 
More than ever before, cities are perceived as the building blocks of 
the global economy. This development is primarily attributable to two key 
trends. First, the proportion of the world’s population that lives in cities is 
growing and will continue to grow. Indeed, the world just reached a 
 
 69.  SIVARAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 24, at 14–15; see also id. at 91–104 (noting that adherence 
to the 74th CAA was among the mandatory reforms required by the JnNURM and more broadly 
discussing reform efforts). 
 70.  NAT’L INST. OF URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 21, at vi. 
 71.  SIVARAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 37, at 1; Lorraine Kennedy & Marie Helen Zerah, The Shift 
to City-Centric Growth Strategies: Perspectives from Hyderabad and Mumbai, 43 ECON. & POL. 
WKLY. 110, 111–12 (2008), http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/The%20shift%20to%20 
city%20 centric_0.pdf. 
 72.  Kennedy & Zerah, supra note 71, at 111–12; see also Rakesh Mohan & Shubhagato 
Dasgupta, The 21st Century: Asia Becomes Urban, 40 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 213, 217 (2005) (“[I]n 
most developing countries especially those in Asia, urbanisation is still often viewed as a disease, and a 
trend that needs to be reversed.”). 
 73.  MOHANTY ET AL., supra note 2, at ii (“After liberalisation of the economy, India made strides 
in economic growth; a large part of it has been through the contribution of urban areas.”). 
 74.  See generally MINISTRY OF URBAN EMP’T & POVERTY ALLEVIATION & MINISTRY OF URBAN 
DEV., JAWAHARLAL NEHRU NATIONAL URBAN RENEWAL MISSION (JNNURM) OVERVIEW 3, 
http://jnnurm.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/UIGOverview.pdf [hereinafter JNNURM OVERVIEW 
3] (projecting urban population growth); Kennedy & Zerah, supra note 71, at 112. 
 75.  MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., URBAN WORLD: MAPPING THE ECONOMIC POWER OF CITIES 1 
(2011) (anticipating that by 2025, 136 new cities will make it on to the list of top 600 cities with the 
greatest effect on global growth—thirteen of these cities will be in India). 
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historic milestone: more than half of the world’s population now lives in 
cities.76 By 2050, the global urbanization rate is expected to reach seventy 
percent.77 Second, cities make up an increasing proportion of total global 
economic output.78 For example, a 2007 McKinsey study that ranked world 
cities by their contribution to global growth found that while the top 100 
cities produced twenty-one trillion dollars in GDP in 2007, or thirty-eight 
percent of the global total, they are expected to produce sixty-four trillion 
dollars in GDP, or nearly sixty percent of the global total, in 2025.79 
Increases in urban economic output and the growing proportion of the 
world’s population that lives in cities highlight the need for increased 
attention to the role that cities play in the global economy. 
India will soon have the fastest global rate of urbanization, due to a 
large increase in its youth population.80 Between 2014 and 2050, the 
number of urban dwellers in India is expected to increase by 404 million.81 
Compared to other rapidly developing countries like China, India is 
comparatively less urbanized, but that will soon change.82 The capital of 
India, New Delhi, has approximately doubled its population since 1990 and 
became the world’s second most populous city in 2014; with nearly 25 
million people, it has nearly three times the population of New York City.83 
Another Indian megacity, Mumbai, is within the top ten most populous 
cities in the world.84 As of 2011, approximately 377 million people 
constituting about thirty-one percent of India’s population lived in urban 
areas.85 With India’s continued rapid urban growth, this figure is expected 
 
 76.  UN DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, supra note 1. 
 77.  UN-HABITAT, UN-HABITAT: STATE OF THE WORLD’S CITIES 2006/2007 (2007), http:// 
www.un habitat.org/documents/media_centre/sowcr2006/SOWCR%205.pdf. 
 78.  See Mohan & Dasgupta, supra note 72, at 214 (“Urbanisation is promoted by (i) economies of 
scale in production particularly in manufacturing; (ii) the existence of information externalities; (iii) 
technology development, particularly in building and transportation technology; (iv) substitution of 
capital for land as made possible by technological developments.”). 
 79.  MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., supra note 75. 
 80.  Sengupta, supra note 1. 
 81.  UN DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, supra note 1 (“In 2014, the proportion of the 
population living in urban areas was 39 percent in lower-middle-income countries and 30 per cent in 
low-income countries. By 2050, these countries are expected to reach, on average, 57 and 48 percent 
urban, respectively.”). 
 82.  Isher Judge Ahluwalia et al., Challenges of Urbanisation in India: An Overview, in 
URBANISATION IN INDIA:CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THE WAY FORWARD, supra note 29, at 1, 
2 (noting that urban populations in other countries are: “45 per cent in China, 54 per cent in Indonesia, 
and 87 per cent in Brazil”); Sengupta, supra note 1. 
 83.  Population: Current Population Estimates, DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, N.Y.C., (2015), http:// 
www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/census/popcur.shtml (last visited Sept. 23, 2015); Sengupta, supra note 1. 
 84.  Sengupta, supra note 1. 
 85.  Ahluwalia et al., supra note 82, at 2. 
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to rise to about forty percent by the year 2021,86 and by 2031, to comprise 
around 600 million people.87 
The sheer size of the urban population presents an enormous challenge 
where shelter, civic amenities, public health, and social security are 
concerned.88 In terms of population, most of the larger states in India would 
be among the biggest countries in the world; even a large-sized district in 
India would be larger than about eighty nations in terms of population.89 A 
huge amount of funding is required to transform urban infrastructure; 
investments for the period between 2011 and 2031 are estimated to be 3.9 
trillion Indian rupees, which is approximately sixty-three billion U.S. 
dollars.90 
Despite its emerging economy, growing middle class and increasing 
international clout, India is also home to millions of people living in 
poverty. The rapid unplanned settlement of large tracts of land has led to a 
huge peri-urban population, which is not always counted in urban 
statistics.91 Historical neglect of cities has led to poor public services and 
housing, which have, in turn, contributed to the proliferation of slums.92 
The urbanization of rural poverty as villagers move to cities in search of 
economic opportunity has also contributed to the expansion of slums.93 
Mega-cities like Mumbai, where more than half the population live in 
slums,94 account for approximately fifty-six percent of the urban 
population; this reflects the geographic distribution of economic 
opportunities.95 The state of infrastructure and civic services in India 
 
 86.  See generally JNNURM OVERVIEW 3, supra note 74. 
 87.  Ahluwalia et al., supra note 82, at 2. 
 88.  MOHANTY ET AL., supra note 2, at 7. 
 89.  See GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 21 (“[The state of] 
Uttar Pradesh would be larger than the world’s sixth largest country.”). 
 90.  HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 35 (The figure in the report is listed as 39.2 lakh crores, 
which translates to 3.9 trillion crores). 
 91.  GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at iv. 
 92.  Kennedy & Zerah, supra note 71, at 112; see also NAT’L INST. OF URBAN AFFAIRS, URBAN 
GOVERNANCE DECENTRALIZATION IN INDIA, at x (2004), http://www.niua.org/Publications/ 
research_studies/urban_governance/urban%20governance_Summary.pdf (noting that many of the 
government schemes during the seventies and early eighties were targeted at just a few large cities, 
benefiting mostly high and middle-income communities). 
 93.  MOHANTY ET AL., supra note 2, at 5. But see Ahluwalia et al., supra note 82, at 2 (“Rural-
urban migration contributed only about 20 per cent to the growth of urban population.”). 
 94.  P.K. DAS & ASSOCS., PLANNERS & ARCHITECTS, MUMBAI’S SLUMS MAP-2 (2011), 
http://www.pk das.com/published/Mumbai%27sSlumsMap-LandReservations.pdf. 
 95.  HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 18; Rao & Bird, supra note 32, at 203. 
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remains dire.96 As the former Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh 
stated, “A major failure of city governance has been our inability to address 
the needs of the poor . . . Cities need people to provide services and our 
people need a decent place to live.”97 
B. In an Important Policy Shift, India Linked Urban Renewal to 
Decentralization 
Over a decade after the passage of the 74th CAA, the government of 
India launched a national scheme designed to simultaneously promote 
urban renewal and decentralize power to municipalities. Created in 2005, 
the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JnNURM) sought 
to improve urban infrastructure and expand basic services in urban areas, 
including slums, through a series of local governance reforms.98 This was 
not the first government scheme introduced to improve urban areas.99 But 
the JnNURM scheme represented an important policy shift because it also 
sought to realize the potential of the 74th CAA by linking financial 
assistance for infrastructure and service delivery to the promotion of 
decentralization and municipal empowerment.100 Consistent with the 
economic and political theories of decentralization, the JnNURM scheme 
was grounded in idea that strengthening municipal government is the key to 
increased urban growth and poverty alleviation. 
Although the JnNURM was not extended by Prime Minister Modi’s 
administration, it is critical to understand the lessons of this urban 
decentralization experiment. The JnNURM required that target cities 
develop frameworks for twenty to twenty-five years, with five-year 
updates.101 It initially consisted of two related schemes: (1) Sub-Mission 
for Urban Infrastructure and Governance, which focused on water supply 
and sanitation, sewerage, solid waste management, road network, urban 
 
 96.  MOHANTY ET AL., supra note 2, at 5 (“The floods in Mumbai, Chennai, Hyderabad and 
Bangalore in the recent past have exposed the vulnerability of cities, their fragile ecology, weak 
infrastructure systems, faulty planning, long records of under-investment and fiscal imbalances.”). 
 97.  Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Speech at the Launch of the Jawaharlal Nehru National 
Urban Renewal Mission, (Dec. 3, 2005), pib.nic.in/newsite/erelcontent.aspx?relid=13823. 
 98.  Ahluwalia et al., supra note 82, at 45–47; HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 29; see generally 
SIVARAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 37 (comprehensively discussing the JnNURM). 
 99.  See generally SIVARAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 37, at 2–12 (discussing prior policy efforts); 
Savage & Dasgupta, supra note 24, at 46–47 (providing summary of key Government of India policies 
designed to improve the quality of life in urban areas). 
 100.   GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 22–26; Kennedy & 
Zerah, supra note 71, at 112–13; Savage & Dasgupta, supra note 24, at 56 (noting that the JnNURM 
represents a “significant shift in public policy” by focusing more on accountability). 
 101.  See SIVARAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 37, at 17–46 (providing an overview of the JnNURM 
scheme and its components). 
 2015 CONSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENTS TO DECENTRALIZATION 99 
transport, and redevelopment of old city areas and was managed by the 
Ministry of Urban Development; and (2) Sub-Mission for Basic Services to 
the Urban Poor (BSUP), which emphasized integrated development of 
slums, including projects for providing shelter, basic services, and other 
related civic amenities and was administered by the Ministry of Urban 
Employment and Poverty Alleviation.102 These two programs targeted 
sixty-five cities of national importance.103 In addition, two programs were 
created under JnNURM for other cities and towns: Urban Infrastructure 
Development Scheme for Small and Medium Towns (UIDSSMT) and 
Integrated Housing & Slum Development Program (IHSDP).104 While UIG 
and UIDSSMAT are city-wide infrastructure-oriented programs, BSUP and 
ISHDP are directed towards creating housing and basic amenities for the 
urban poor, especially slum-dwellers.105 
The JnNURM also sought to promote grassroots democracy through 
citizen-oriented municipal reforms. Participating cities were expected to 
formulate City Development Plans that identified appropriate projects. For 
each project, the city or appropriate parastatal agency—usually a semi-
autonomous public corporation—prepared a Detailed Project Report 
identifying the life-cycle costs of the project, including capital outlays, 
operations, and maintenance. Once approved, the funds flowed from the 
central government to the state government and, finally, to the designated 
“State Level Nodal Agency,” which disbursed them. Most importantly for 
the purposes of this article, the JnNURM not only linked infrastructure 
financing to governance reforms at the state and local levels, but looked to 
the 74th CAA and community participation as vehicles for achieving 
reform.106 
 
 102.   JNNURM OVERVIEW 3, supra note 74, at 5–6. 
 103.  GRANT THORNTON, APPRAISAL OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU NATIONAL URBAN RENEWAL 
MISSION (JNNURM) 253 (2011), http://jnnurm.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Appraisal-of-
JnNURM-Final-Report-Volume-I-.pdf; MINISTRY OF HOUS. & URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION, GOV’T 
OF INDIA, OVER ALL PROGRESS OF JNNURM UNDER BSUP AND IHSDP- NATIONAL LEVEL (2015), 
http://ipomstest.cgg.gov.in/jnnurm/Jnnurm_Ray_AHP_Progress_Report/Jnnurm_Glance_All_Progress.
pdf (noting that as of January 2015, 481 BSUP projects in 62 cities/towns and 1,037 IHSDP projects in 
887 cities/towns were implemented for a total project cost of 31,732.77 crore’s of rupees); PLANNING 
COMM’N, GOV’T OF INDIA, TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN (2012-2017): ECONOMIC SECTORS - VOLUME II, 
at 1, 353 (2013), http://planning commission.nic.in/plans/planrel/12thplan/pdf/vol_2.pdf [hereinafter 
TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II]. 
 104.  THORNTON, supra note 103.  
 105.  See id. (introducing the JnNURM mission). 
 106.  Kennedy & Zerah, supra note 71, at 113 (“These reforms aim to alter rules and regulations 
relating to urban development by clarifying institutional responsibilities, repealing land regulations, 
modernising the functioning of municipalities, enhancing their revenues and fiscal responsibility, 
among other things.”). 
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The JnNURM led to increased investment in urban areas, though there 
were significant implementation challenges.107 The central government’s 
initial outlay of approximately 661 billion rupees (10.7 billion U.S. dollars) 
resulted in an overall commitment of approximately 1.237 trillion rupees 
(20 billion U.S. dollars) during the first seven years (2005–2012).108 While 
the scheme officially ended in 2012, it was extended for another two years 
until 2014.109 The Congress-led government of Manmohan Singh had been 
planning to launch a second phase of JnNURM, which was to dispense 
with the concept of “mission cities” and, instead, cover all towns and 
cities.110 The government had also proposed other revisions to streamline 
the scheme and reduce overlap with other national programs. 111 
But recently elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi replaced the 
JnNURM with his own urban renewal scheme, known as the Atal Mission 
for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT).112 The AMRUT 
 
 107.  See Smriti Kak Ramachandran, Urban Renewal Mission a Failure: CAG, HINDU (Dec. 1, 
2012), http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/urban-renewal-mission-a-failure-cag/article 
4152567.ece (describing implementation challenges). 
 108.  TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 322 (as reported, the initial outlay 
was 66,085 crore and the overall commitment was 123,711 crore; one crore is equal to 10 million); 
Isher Judge Ahluwalia, Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery, in URBANISATION IN INDIA: 
CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THE WAY FORWARD, supra note 29, at 31, 46 (“The Government of 
India committed 66,000 [rupees] crore over the Mission period of seven years (extended later to nine) 
as its share in the total investment of over 100,000 [rupees] crore for a pool of selected projects to be 
proposed by the ULBs and state governments and approved by the Government of India.”). 
 109.  Deepak Nagpal, Narendra Modi Government to Drop Jawaharlal Nehru’s Name from 
JNNURM?, ZEE NEWS (Aug.12, 2014), http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/narendra-modi-
government-to-drop-jawaharlal-nehru-s-name-from-jnnurm_954093.html. 
 110.  TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 353. But see generally SAMA 
KHAN, THE OTHER JNNURM: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR SMALL TOWNS IN INDIA? (2014), http://cpr 
india.org/sites/default/files/The%20Other%20JNNURM.pdf (discussing bias against small towns). 
 111.  The JnNURM II was to have these components: (1) Urban Infrastructure and Governance 
(UIG); (2) Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY); (3) Slum rehabilitation in cities not covered under RAY; and (4) 
a separate fund dedicated to Capacity Building. Under the five-year budget for the JnNURM set forth in 
Twelfth Five Year Plan, the first three programs would receive 80 percent of the funding; the Capacity 
Building program would receive 10 percent; and an additional Incentive Fund would receive the final 
10 percent. See MINISTRY OF HOUS. & URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION, GOV’T OF INDIA, OFFICE 
MEMORANDUM: EXTENSION OF TIME PERIOD BY ONE YEAR UP TO 2014–15 FOR COMPLETION OF 
PROJECTS SANCTIONED TILL MARCH 2012 AND IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORMS UNDER THE SUB-
MISSION ON BASIC SERVICES TO THE URBAN POOR (BSUP) AND INTEGRATED HOUSING AND SLUM 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (IHSDP) - COMPONENTS OF THE JAWAHARLAL NEHRU NATIONAL URBAN 
RENEWAL MISSION (JNNURM) (2013), https://jnnurmmis.nic.in/jn nurm_hupa/jnnurm/jnnurm_ 
Extension_2014-15_19_09_2013.pdf (noting that BSUP and IHSDP programs would be discontinued 
but be given an additional extension until March 2015 to complete existing projects); TWELFTH FIVE 
YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 338–39, 353–54 (noting that the slum rehabilitation 
scheme known as Rajiv Awas Yojana would be integrated into the JnNURM-II). 
 112.  PM’s Remarks, supra note 9. 
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has a wider geographic scope than the JnNURM, focusing on 500 cities113 
as opposed to sixty-five.114 Despite their differences, the JnNURM and the 
AMRUT have a critical similarity. By providing greater funds to those 
states that devolve power down to the municipal level, both encourage 
decentralization using the promise of urban renewal funds.115 Among other 
programs, 116 Modi has also created a “Smart Cities” program117 and a 
“Housing for All” campaign that aims to make affordable housing available 
for all by 2022.118 
As India prepares to enter a new phase of urban renewal under Prime 
Minister Modi, the time is ripe for reflecting on the successes and failures 
of the JnNURM. The government of India has acknowledged many of the 
JnNURM’s shortcomings, including variable results across the country; 
lack of capacity at the local level to implement reforms; incomplete 
governance and financial reforms; an inability to leverage additional 
financial resources from the private sector via public-private partnerships; 
and the dominant role of the central government.119 Despite programs 
 
 113.  MINISTRY OF URBAN DEV., GOV’T OF INDIA, ATAL MISSION FOR REJUVENATION AND URBAN 
TRANSFORMATION: MISSION STATEMENT AND GUIDELINES 6 (2015), http://amrut.gov.in/ 
writereaddata/ AMRUT%20Guidelines%20.pdf [hereinafter ATAL MISSION]. 
 114.  See generally Amitabh Kundu, India’s Sluggish Urbanisation and its Exclusionary 
Development, in URBAN GROWTH IN EMERGING ECONOMIES: LESSONS FROM THE BRICS 191, 191–
232 (2014) (analyzing India’s urban growth in contrast with other countries); ATAL MISSION, supra 
note 113 (drawing attention to the scheme’s emphasis on cities with 100,000 people or more and its 
strong focus on improving the water supply, sewerage and septage management, storm water drainage, 
urban transport and the development of green spaces and parks). 
 115.  ATAL MISSION, supra note 113, at 8–9. The way in which the JnNURM and the AMRUT tie 
funding to reform adoption is different. The JnNURM employs a more punitive model—states that are 
found not complying with the plan’s timeline for the devolution of powers are denied funds that they 
would have otherwise been able to access. In contrast, AMRUT employs an incentive based model in 
which states that are found in compliance are given additional funds. A full ten percent of AMRUT’s 
initial plan outlay has been earmarked for these incentive payments. Id. 
 116.  See, e.g., PM Modi’s Digital India Campaign All Set to Roll Out Next Month, INDIA TODAY 
(Oct. 2, 2014), http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/pm-modis-digital-india-campaign-all-set-to-roll-out-
next-month/1/393789.html  (noting that in the first stage of this campaign, the central government 
hopes to provide free Wi-Fi to 2,500 cities in towns and that campaign is believed to take at least three 
years). 
 117.  But see Persis Taraporevala, Creating Subjects in Lavasa: The Private City, OPEN SECURITY 
(Apr. 16, 2013), https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/persis-taraporevala/creating-subjects-in-
lavasa-private-city (outlining concerns about a trend in India towards the creation of cities that are 
governed by corporations that have no democratic governance structure). 
 118.  PM Narendra Modi Reviews Preparations for “Housing for All” Project, ECON. TIMES (Jan. 
21, 2015), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-01-21/news/58306298_1_ program me-
prime-minister-narendra-modi-national-housing-bank. 
 119.  See HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 33 (drawing attention also to the lack of clarity in the 
reforms and the unwillingness of state governments to devolve power down to local governments); 
Ahluwalia, supra note 108, at 50–52; TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 323. 
 102 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol. 26:79 
intended to provide basic services to the urban poor, this goal has remained 
largely unmet.120 The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India 
also found that the JnNURM’s attempt to strengthen urban local bodies was 
unsuccessful. The CAG noted that: 
 
Other than execution of housing and urban infrastructure, it [the 
JnNURM] was also intended to strengthen the urban local bodies 
(ULBs) in terms of their structure, composition, financial resources, 
functions and powers. . . . However in the selected States/UTs [Union 
Territories], we observed that all the mandatory and optional reforms 
were not implemented as per the commitments made in the 
Memorandum of Agreement. Thus the objective of bringing about 
reforms in institutional, financial and structural governance structure of 
the ULBs to make them efficient, accountable and transparent could not 
be achieved as has been envisaged.121 
 
This article argues that the JnNURM did not achieve its ultimate goals in 
large part because of larger constitutional challenges to decentralization 
that persist today. 
III. IMPEDIMENTS TO DECENTRALIZATION OF POWER TO 
CITIES 
The structure of India’s Constitution both promotes and impedes the 
processes of decentralization and municipal empowerment. Political 
decentralization has proven difficult because states can—but are not 
required to —devolve power to municipalities under the 74th CAA. As a 
result, states have not given as much authority to municipalities as the 
drafters of the 74th CAA originally contemplated. India’s efforts at 
administrative decentralization have been hindered by the municipalities’ 
lack of capacity and technical expertise, as well as competition with 
entrenched parastatal agencies. Those barriers, in turn, have reduced the 
states’ incentives to devolve power to municipalities. Fiscal de-
centralization has not occurred because financial responsibility, but not 
revenue, has been devolved to municipalities. Although the JnNURM 
harnessed national funds for urban renewal, these funds were channeled 
through the states and, therefore, the outlays did not result in a 
transformation of the fiscal federal system. The challenges to India’s 
 
 120.  See Kennedy & Zerah, supra note 71, at 113 (noting the lack of attention to the poor “despite 
a sub-mission dedicated to basic services of the urban poor” (internal parentheses omitted)). 
 121.  Ramachandran, supra note 107. 
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political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization efforts are explored in 
the sub-sections that follow.122 
A.  Political Decentralization 
The comparatively recent focus on empowering India’s cities is in 
stark contrast with India’s history as a highly centralized federal system. As 
argued below, this history is critical to understanding the challenges to 
effectively decentralizing power to municipalities in India. Although the 
74th CAA constitutionally recognized municipalities, it did not confer 
independent political power to them. Rather, municipalities derive their 
authority from the states—and the states must enact legislation to devolve 
power to the municipalities. States were likely reluctant to decentralize 
power to local bodies because of the states’ historically weak position vis-
à-vis the national government. 
1. States in India Have Historically Been Weak Vis-à-Vis the Central 
Government 
When India achieved independence from the British in 1947, the 
drafters of the Indian Constitution believed that federalism could address 
the need for political stability and help to transform the economy.123 Given 
India’s diverse population and geographically concentrated minorities, 
federalism’s potential to mitigate intrastate conflict made it particularly 
attractive.124 Even prior to independence, India was moving in the direction 
of federalism.125 The then-Princely States called for federalism in reaction 
 
 122.  Political scientists Aaron Schneider and Daniel Treisman each establish a helpful framework 
for conceptualizing decentralization. See Aaron Schneider, Decentralization: Conceptualization and 
Measurement, 38 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 32, 32–56 (2003) (defining decentralization through three 
core dimensions: fiscal, administrative, and political); Daniel Treisman, Defining and Measuring 
Decentralization: A Global Perspective (March 2002) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.ssc 
net.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/Papers/defin.pdf (dividing decentra-lization into a number of 
different forms that are subsumed here into the term “political decentralization). 
 123.  See generally RATH, supra note 12, at 34–35 (noting that the drafters hoped federalism would 
reconcile conflicting groups in India and that although India adopted a federal system, “the word 
‘federation’ or ‘federal’ occurs nowhere in the Constitution”). 
 124.  See id. at 31–34 (noting that the Muslim community also believed that their rights would be 
better protected under a federal government than under a unitary government); see also Nancy Bermeo, 
A New Look at Federalism: The Import of Institutions, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 96, 97 (2002), http:// 
www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/stm103%20articles/bermeo_Federalism_conflict.pdf (finding 
that rather than increasing ethnic conflict, federal systems may play a key role in helping ethnic groups 
achieve peaceful political accommodation). 
 125.  See Round Table Conference, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/ 
EBchecked/topic/510855/Round-Table-Conference (last visited Sept. 22, 2015) (noting that the 
possibility of making India’s government a federal system was discussed at the Round Table 
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to British rule. They perceived the British as having encroached upon their 
power and were worried about the possibility that the central government 
of India might one day be able to do the same.126 
Although India’s national government is a de jure union government, 
it is often considered to be a de facto central government because of the 
strength of the national government compared to the state governments.127 
Despite its linguistic, religious, and ethnic diversity, India is also 
comparatively more centralized than other federal countries.128 India can be 
described as a holding together federation; in contrast, the United States is 
a coming together federation comprised of states that were autonomous 
before uniting.129 While the decision to use the word “[u]nion” or “central” 
to describe India’s national government may reflect user bias,130 the terms 
“central government” or “the Center” are used throughout this article 
because they are used in many national government reports.131 
Several factors have contributed to the centralization of power in 
India. India was founded as a “sovereign socialist . . . democratic 
republic,”132 and, as a result, the central government played a strong role in 
economic development during India’s first few decades as an independent 
 
Conferences of 1930–32 and that these conferences then led to the development of the 1935 
Government of India Act, which did in fact establish a federal system that was never used in practice). 
 126.  See RATH, supra note 12, at 31 (noting how the Princes viewed federalism was a way “to 
strengthen their position and secure some power in determining all-Indian policies”). 
 127.  Chaubey, Federalism in India, supra note 16, at 1, 3, 5; see also RATH, supra note 12, at 18 
(noting that the Indian system is “unitary” and “effective”). 
 128.  See Shrawan K. Singh, Federal Transfers in India: An Introduction, in FISCAL FEDERALISM 
IN INDIA, supra note 15, at 11, 14; See RATH, supra note 12, at 19 (noting that India is an asymmetric 
federation, where linguistic, religious or linguistic cleavages can “coincid[e] with the sub-national 
units”). 
 129.  See RATH, supra note 12, at 55 (noting that India’s federalism and parliamentary system can 
work against each other); Douglas V. Verney, Federalism, Federative Systems, and Federations: The 
United States, Canada, and India, 25 PUBLIUS 81, 81, 83 (1995) (noting that the term “federalism” was 
first articulated by the framers of the U.S. Constitution, and that federalism in India combines some of 
these American ideals with the British parliamentary tradition). 
 130.  See Chaubey, Union-State Fiscal Relations, supra note 15, at 44, n.1, 2 (arguing that referring 
to the national government as the “Center” is extra-constitutional, if not unconstitutional, and also 
noting that the term “state” in the Constitution has different meanings because it is used to refer to the 
union government, the state governments, and also more generally to public entities). 
 131.  See, e.g., B.K. CHATURVEDI, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON RESTRUCTURING OF 
CENTRALLY SPONSORED SCHEMES (CSS) 24 (2011), http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/ 
css/rep_css1710.pdf (noting that the JnNURM was a so-called “centrally sponsored scheme”); 
MINISTRY OF FIN., AN ECONOMIC AND FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
BUDGET (2006–2007), http://finmin.nic.in/reports/FunClass200607.pdf; MINISTRY OF FIN., REPORT OF 
THE COMMITTEE FOR EVOLVING A COMPOSITE DEVELOPMENT INDEX OF STATES (2013), http://fin 
min.nic.in/reports/Report CompDevState.pdf. 
 132.  INDIA CONST. pmbl.  
 2015 CONSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENTS TO DECENTRALIZATION 105 
country.133 The Constitution also gives the central government broad 
authority compared to the states. For example, while a Proclamation of 
Emergency is in effect, Article 250 allows the central legislature to make 
laws with respect to matters in the State List.134 In addition, Article 353(b) 
gives the central government the power to create laws on issues not 
explicitly in the Union list.135 During an emergency, Article 354 gives the 
president the power to suspend provisions relating to the transfer of 
revenue from the Center to the states.136 
The 1960s and 1970s, in particular, witnessed a strong consolidation 
of power at the Center.137 Under Indira’s Gandhi initial term (1966–1977), 
the Indian National Congress required Congress-led states to choose party 
nominees for the position of State Chief Minister, and the central 
government also committed itself to working to destabilize opposition-
controlled state governments.138 In addition, Gandhi frequently invoked 
Article 356 of the Constitution, which allows the central government to 
take over the state when the state government is not “in accordance with 
the provisions of this Constitution.”139 The central government further 
strengthened its power during the State of Emergency declared between 
1975 and 1977.140 
 
 133.  T.V. Sathyamurthy, Impact of Centre-State Relations on Indian Politics: An Interpretative 
Reckoning, 1947–87, 24 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2133, 2135–36 (1989). In the 1960s, the Indian 
government became even more centralized as it tried to deal with the mass unrest that resulted from 
increasing dissatisfaction with what had previously been the ruling party, the Congress Party. Id. It was 
during this time that the Congress Party began to require Congress-led states to choose one of the 
party’s nominees for the position of Chief Minister. Id. At this time, the Centre also committed itself to 
working to destabilize opposition-control state governments. Id.; see also RATH, supra note 12, at 50 
(“[P]oints of dispute [between the Centre and the States] began to raise their heads from the time of the 
formulation of the Third Five-Year plan. They assumed greater magnitude as a result of the political 
developments after 1964—after the death of Nehru, the economic difficulties of 1965 and 1966, the 
interruption in planning, and the changing political situation, especially after the General Election in 
1967.”). 
 134.  INDIA CONST. art. 250. 
 135.  INDIA CONST. art. 353(b). 
 136.  M. GOVINDA RAO & NIRVIKAR SINGH, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEDERALISM IN INDIA 49 
(2005). 
 137.  G. RADHAKRISHNA KURUP, POLITICS OF CONGRESS FACTIONALISM IN KERALA SINCE 1982, 
at 49, 52–53, 75 (2004). Indira Gandhi has been credited both for the split of the Congress Party in 1966 
and the creation of the Janata Party. Gandhi contributed to the split of the Congress Party by choosing 
her own candidate for President instead of the party nominated one. The Janata Party was later formed 
by individuals who were outraged by the excessive centralization of Gandhi’s rule. Id. 
 138.  Sathyamurthy, supra note 133, at 2136. 
 139.  See INDIA CONST. art. 356 (outlining “provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery 
in States”). 
 140.  See, e.g., VIOLATION OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN INDIA 196–98, 201 (A.R. Desai ed., 1986) 
(noting that the central government further strengthened its power by making a number of changes to 
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Although Gandhi’s Congress Party was replaced by the opposition 
Janata Party in 1977, the trend towards centralization continued—and was 
even exacerbated.141 While the central government had previously taken 
over states by declaring “President’s Rule,” the Janata government went 
further, seeking to dissolve all the state assemblies at once.142 The central 
government had so much power that it was referred to as a unique “hybrid 
of a federal and unitary constitutional structure”143 or “quasi-federal.”144 As 
these political dynamics illustrate, “the federal process is very difficult to 
achieve in countries where the federal principle is combined with a 
parliamentary system of government for it is generally accepted that the 
two systems work almost in opposite directions—federalism tends to 
diffuse power whereas a parliamentary system tends to concentrate 
power.”145 
This excessive centralization was met with growing calls for greater 
state autonomy and even secession.146 As a result, several commissions 
were constituted to study center-state relations, but it is not clear whether 
they have had any substantive impact. For example, a committee was 
constituted in 1969 during Gandhi’s first term to study state autonomy and 
center-state relations under the chairmanship of P.V. Rajmannar, but the 
ultimate recommendations were ignored by the Center.147 In 1984, Gandhi, 
 
the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA), which involved progressively stripping political 
prisoners and other detainees of their rights); UJJWAL KUMAR SINGH, THE STATE, DEMOCRACY AND 
ANTI-TERROR LAWS IN INDIA 65 (2007) (discussing how the National Emergency of 1975 allowed 
MISA to assume “formidable proportions”). 
 141.  See RATH, supra note 12, at 75–76 (noting how the Center proposed dissolution of several 
State Assemblies in 1977). 
 142.  Id. at 76; see also MIKHAIL FILIPPOV ET AL., DESIGNING FEDERALISM: A THEORY OF SELF-
SUSTAINABLE FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS 214 n.28 (2004) (noting that India’s federalism is not “market 
preserving” due to a lack of “credible commitment to limiting the role of the center in economic 
regulation”). 
 143.  Vasuki Nesiah, Federalism and Diversity in India, in AUTONOMY AND ETHNICITY: 
NEGOTIATING COMPETING CLAIMS IN MULTI-ETHNIC STATES 53, 54 (Yash Ghai ed., 2000). 
 144.  Aiyar, supra note 5, at 115. But see Ramachandran, supra note 5, at 58 (taking issue with the 
use of the term “quasi-federal” on the basis that it suggests that the Indian system is based on an 
underlying idea that is “not federal,” which he does not believe is the case). 
 145.  Rath, supra note 12, at 55. 
 146.  See id. at 72 (“The States demanded more autonomy by flaunting threats of secession.”); B.D. 
DUA, THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM IN INDIA, IN INDIAN FEDERALISM IN THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM 131 (2003). 
 147.  RATH, supra note 12, at 39–40 (noting that the committee, which was constituted in 1969, 
recommended the omission of Articles 256, 257, and 339(2) of India’s constitution, which would have 
significantly reduced the control over the States by the Union and increased state autonomy); Indira 
Ghandi: Prime Minister of India, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/biography/ 
Indira-Gandhi (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (stating that Indira Gandhi initially became Prime Minister in 
1966, leaving that office in 1977). 
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in her second term as Prime Minister, commissioned Supreme Court Justice 
Rajinder Sarkaria to lead a committee examining the state of center-state 
relations. Yet despite its length, the final report produced by the Sarkaria 
Commission suggested little in the way of structural reform.148 Instead, it 
focused more on the stabilization of center-state relations. Some believed 
the Sarkaria Commission to be a political maneuver by Indira Gandhi so 
she could seem to be responding to the concerns of regional actors.149 The 
Sarkaria Commission’s ultimate lack of “claws” also demonstrated the 
difficulty of translating political will alone into meaningful change. 
While the Sarkaria Commission focused on the stabilization of center-
state relations, it also made several recommendations that would have 
strengthened the position of the states vis-à-vis the central government. 
This specific subset of recommendations attempted to confer more power 
on the states and state leaders and to protect the states from negative 
interference by the central government. For example, the Commission 
recommended that all residual powers, except those related to taxation, go 
to the Concurrent List.150 The Commission also tried to protect the state 
governments from central interference by prescribing restraint in the central 
government’s use of Article 356 of the Constitution.151 Finally, the 
Commission tried to limit gubernatorial manipulation by the Center by 
recommending that state governors not come from the Center’s ruling 
party.152 While, as a whole, the Sarkaria Commission’s recommendations 
served to reinforce the status-quo in center-state relations, there was a 
specific group of provisions that—if implemented—could have greatly 
strengthened the position of the states. 
Although few of the Sarkaria Commission’s recommendations were 
implemented, the late 1980s saw a major breakthrough in the movement 
towards greater decentralization.153 In 1989, for the first time, the Indian 
Parliament reviewed a set of legislative bills, known as the 64th and 65th 
Amendments, designed to give the panchayats and municipalities 
constitutional status. At that time, then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was 
likely looking to check the power of state leaders as the Congress Party had 
 
 148.  Amal Ray, The Sarkaria Commission’s Perspective: An Appraisal, 23 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 
1131, 1131 (1988).  
 149.  Lawrence Saez, The Sarkaria Commission and India’s Struggle for Federalism, 8 CONTEMP. 
S. ASIA 41, 42 (1999). 
 150.  SARKARIA COMMISSION REPORT ¶¶ 2.4.03, 2.6.16 (1988), http://www.gangothri.org/node/74. 
 151.  Id. ¶ 3.5.23. 
 152.  See id. ¶ 4.6.09 (stating that the governor should be from “outside the State”). 
 153.  See generally SIVARAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 24 (describing the dynamics of 
decentralization in India over numerous decades). 
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just lost control in a number of states.154 This was also a time when the 
unity of the Indian state was being questioned. As separatists in central 
India and Uttar Pradesh gained strength, it became clear that some power 
needed to be devolved to keep the union intact.155 “[A]s the states gained 
more bargaining power in the 1980s, the Center may have looked to 
stronger local governments as a counterweight.”156 Gandhi’s political 
inexperience combined with the political exigencies of the time allowed 
him to take a fairly radical step forward towards local democracy.157 
While the 64th and 65th Amendments failed in the Rajya Sabha, 
movement towards greater decentralization continued in the 1990s. In 
1990, the Sarkaria Commission’s recommendation for the creation of an 
Inter-State Council (ISC) was implemented.158 The ISC was charged with 
reviewing the other recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission.159 In 
particular, the Council accepted the Sarkaria Commission’s recom-
mendation that when making legislation on items in the Concurrent List, 
the central government should consult with the state governments.160 While 
little attention was given to the Sarkaria Commission recommendations in 
the first two years after they were issued, the creation of the ISC 
represented a positive step forward. The creation of the ISC was important 
not only because it meant that one of the Commission’s recommendations 
was being realized, but also because it provided a forum for continuing 
debate on the rest of the recommendations made by the Sarkaria 
Commission. 
 
 154.  D. Bandyopadhyay et al., Dependency vs Autonomy: The Identity Crisis of India’s 
Panchayats, in GRASS-ROOTS DEMOCRACY IN INDIA AND CHINA: THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE 53, 63 
(Manoranjan Mohanty et al. eds., 2007). 
 155.  Bandyopadhyay et al., supra note 154, at 63. 
 156.  RAO & SINGH, supra note 136, at 61; see also CRISPIN BATES & SUBHO BASU, RETHINKING 
INDIAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 186–89 (2005) (noting that the next major piece of legislation that 
focused on local government was the 64th Constitutional Amendment, but the bill ironically did not 
pass because it was perceived as a ploy by the Indian National Congress to expand the role of the 
Center); B.K. Chandrashekar, Panchayati Raj Bill: The Real Flaw, 24 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1433, 1433 
(1989) (drawing attention to the 1978 Asok Mehta report, which stated that panchayati raj institutions 
should be established, and that they “could be empowered by the state legislature with executive and 
administrative functions”). 
 157.  Bandyopadhyay et al., supra note 154, at 62. 
 158.  HAMID HUSSAIN, INDIAN FEDERALISM: EMERGING TRENDS 28–30 (2010). 
 159.  LAWRENCE SÁEZ, FEDERALISM WITHOUT A CENTRE: THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC REFORM ON INDIA’S FEDERAL SYSTEM 126–27 (2002) (noting that between 1991 and 1993 
the ISC developed recommendations related to 179 of the Sarkaria Commissions 247 proposals, and 
that the ISC recommended implementing 130 of the Commission’s recommendations as they were 
originally written, slightly modifying twenty-five of these recommendations, and not implementing 
twenty-four of the Commission’s recommendations). 
 160.  Id. at 127. 
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In 1992, with the passage of the 73rd and 74th Constitutional 
Amendment Acts, panchayats and municipalities were given constitutional 
status for the first time in India’s history. The draft version of these two 
amendments came out of an extended discussion led by then Prime 
Minister V. P. Singh at the June Conference of Chief Ministers.161 The 73rd 
and 74th Amendments were structured in a very similar manner to the 
proposed 64th and 65th Amendments. The 73rd Amendment, like the 64th 
Amendment, focused on the devolution of power down to the panchayats 
while the 74th Amendment, like the 65th Amendment, pertained to the 
devolution of power down to urban local bodies. The main difference 
between them is that the 73rd and 74th Amendments devolved more power 
to the states. The writers of the 73rd and 74th Amendments appeared 
cognizant of the fact that one of the main reasons the 64th and 65th 
Amendments were defeated is that they were seen as a ploy by the Center 
to bypass the states. Motivated by this concern, the authors of the 73rd and 
74th Amendments took pains to identify areas where power could remain 
with the states and areas where the panchayats and municipalities could be 
empowered to function as units of self-government.162 This work paid off 
and the 73rd and 74th CAAs were passed. After a decades-long push for 
greater political decentralization, India had finally created a constitutionally 
enshrined third tier of government.163 
However, the 73rd and 74th Amendments were not without 
weaknesses. While Article 243Q of the Constitution states that 
municipalities should be created in every state, it is followed by a proviso 
stating that municipalities do not have to be created in urban areas 
designated as industrial townships.164 Critics claim that this proviso goes 
against the basic spirit of the 74th Amendment,165 and as the number of 
industrial townships or Special Economic Zones has grown since 2005, this 
proviso has gained greater salience. 
 
 161.  SHRIRAM MAHESHWARI, THE INDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE YEAR BOOK: 1990, at 222 (1990). A 
fierce debate occurred at the June Conference of Chief Ministers over the devolution of power. There 
were two subjects in particular on which the ministers present at this conference did not agree. The first 
was the role that State Finance Commissions should play in monitoring local financing. The second was 
how general elections should be held. Id. 
 162.  See generally SWETA MISHRA, DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA: STUDY IN 
RETROSPECT & PROSPECT 82–97 (1994). 
 163.  See id. (noting that one of the main differences between these two bills is that a number of the 
different powers that were to be assigned to the Center in the 64th and 65th amendment would now be 
assigned to the state legislatures). 
 164.  INDIA CONST. art. 243Q. 
 165.  K.C. Sivaramakrishnan, The Devolution Deficit, INDIAN EXPRESS (May 1, 2013), http:// 
archive.indianexpress.com/news/the-devolution-deficit/1109816/. 
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After the passage of the 73rd and 74th CAAs, several factors led to an 
improvement in the position of the states vis-à-vis the central 
government.166 Thanks to economic liberalization, state-level regulation 
assumed new importance as pressure mounted for less regulation at the 
national level. The 1990s also saw new coalitions form between national 
and regional parties as national parties struggled to win an outright majority 
in the national polls.167 Because many leaders of regional parties were also 
state leaders, this development indirectly increased the power of the states. 
The last factor that contributed to the growing influence of the states post-
1992 is the S.R. Bommai v. Union of India ruling of 1994.168 In this seminal 
case, the Supreme Court placed limitations on the President’s ability to use 
Article 356 of the Indian Constitution to dismiss state governments.169 As a 
result of these key economic, political, and legal developments, the power 
of the states increased in the 1990s, which limited the centralizing 
tendencies in India to a degree.170 However, even with these reforms, India 
is still a highly centralized federal country. 
The recent election calls into question the trend toward state-oriented 
power. In May 2014, the BJP, a national party, won the highest number of 
seats by a single party in what is now being described as the “post-regional 
politics era.”171 With 282 out of 543 seats, the BJP successfully formed a 
government without a coalition, “a feat that no party has come close to 
 
 166.  GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 13 (noting that states 
were devolved greater power due to the “rise of regional parties and coalition governments at the State 
and Union levels, greater economic liberalisation reducing State control and diminishing the importance 
of State investment in commercial undertakings, a very healthy tradition of fair non-discriminatory 
fiscal devolution through various mechanisms and compulsions of economic growth engendering a 
healthy competition for investment”); see also Aseema Sinha, The Changing Political Economy of 
Federalism in India: A Historical Institutionalist Approach, 3 INDIA REV. 25, 26 (2004) (explaining that 
the nature of competition for states in India transitioned from vertical competition (for resources from 
the Center) to horizontal competition (states competing with each other)). 
 167.  See Milan Vaishnav, The Complicated Rise of India’s Regional Parties, CARNEGIE 
ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, (Nov. 13, 2013), http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/11/13/ 
complicated-rise-of-india-s-regional-parties/gtph (indicating that due to the rise of regional parties, it 
has become unimaginable for one single party to control the Indian government).  
 168.  See generally S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 2 S.C.R. 644 (India). 
 169.  M.P. Singh, Towards a More Federalized Parliamentary System in India: Explaining 
Functional Change, 74 PAC. AFF. 553, 565-66, 558 (2001). The case arose because in 1991, the then 
Governor of Tamil Nadu refused to officially recommend the dismissal of his government when asked 
to do so by the central government. Historically, when the central government indicated that a governor 
needed to recommend the dismissal of their government the governors did so without question because 
of their close ties to the central government. Id. 
 170.  See HUSSAIN, supra note 158, at 81–91 (noting an era of coalition governments after 1989 
that often contained regional parties). 
 171.  S. Rukmini, How the BJP Won this Election, HINDU (May 18, 2014), http://www.the 
hindu.com/news/national/how-the-bjp-won-this-election/article6020712.ece. 
 2015 CONSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENTS TO DECENTRALIZATION 111 
since the 1984 election which saw a wave of sympathy following the 
assassination of Congress Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.”172 Indeed, this is 
the first time in Indian history that any single party secured more votes than 
the Congress Party.173 Although the new Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, 
rose to power as the leader of the state of Gujarat, he has an “authoritarian” 
leadership style because “[b]y instinct [he] centralises power.”174 A 
spowerful Prime Minister’s office could make it difficult for Modi to 
provide a greater role for states in policymaking.175 
2. Cities Derive Their Power from the State 
India’s history as a highly centralized country and the ongoing 
struggle by states for greater power provides important context for 
understanding the challenges to municipal decentralization in India. After 
the passage of the 74th Constitutional Amendment, the transfer of power 
and funds to municipalities has been nominal in most states.176 Significant 
variation exists in the extent to which states have devolved authority to 
municipalities.177 This reflects one of the challenges of decentralization in a 
federal country where the central government does not have a direct 
relationship with the municipal level. Instead, the local government is 
completely under the authority of the state government.178 Uniformity of 
 
 172.  Id. But see Adam Ziegfeld, India’s Election Isn’t as Historic as People Think, WASH. POST 
(May 16, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/16/indias-election-
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approximately 31% of the vote. Like the U.S., India has a single-member district (SMD) electoral 
system, which means that votes do not necessarily translate proportionally into seats. Id. 
 173.  See Narendra Modi, Promising the Good Times, ECONOMIST (May 24, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21602710-overwhelming-election-victory-promises-reshape-
indian-politics-promising-good-times (“Mr Modi’s victory has disproved an article of political faith 
from the past three decades: that India’s messy democracy, cursed by strong regional and caste-based 
parties, could produce only fragmented outcomes and weak coalition governments. This, the clearest 
result since 1984, should mean stable, decisive and predictable rule. Mr Modi, not one to hold back, 
hints at being in office for a decade or more.”). 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  See Ziegfeld, supra note 172 (“Moving forward, the implications of this election for policy 
may be profound. A return to single-party majority government for the first time in 25 years and a BJP-
led government unfettered by the demands of coalition partners may well produce policy changes 
unlike anything we have seen before in India.”); Vaishnav, supra note 167 (identifying trends that 
suggest that “regional parties may not be the juggernauts many observers make them out to be”). 
 176.  GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at iii. 
 177.  See HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 87 (“The [74th Constitutional] Amendment is even less 
clear on the devolution of finances . . . leaving it to the discretion of state legislatures. State 
governments have only partially complied with devolution, and this has typically not been accompanied 
by the devolution of funds and functionaries.”); Mohanty, supra note 29, at 123–24 (“[W]ide 
differences exist between states on the assignment of functions to municipalities.”). 
 178.  Political Decentralization, THE WORLD BANK GRP., http://www1.worldbank.org/public 
sector/decentralization/political.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (noting that in a federal system such as 
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state and local-level reforms would be very difficult to achieve in any 
federal system, but the enormous economic and social variation between 
Indian states and Union Territories compounds this challenge immensely. 
The biggest challenge for decentralization in India is that the process 
requires the active participation and consent of states.179 There are differing 
views on the proper balance of power between the states and the 
municipalities, and in some instances, the central government has 
overstated the mandate to decentralize.180 For example, the Planning 
Commission of India, in its Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012–2017), stated, 
“Despite the 74th Constitutional Amendment, which required States to 
transfer eighteen functions to the ULBs, there is significant variation in 
devolution of functions, functionaries and funds across the States.”181 The 
Planning Commission has since been replaced by the National Institution 
for Transforming India (NITI) Aayog,182 but the Five Year Plan still 
provides valuable insight into the goals of the JnNURM. In fact, states are 
not required to devolve authority; rather, it is discretionary.183 Indeed, 
many states have interpreted the provision of Article 243W relating to the 
powers of local authorities as advisory only.184 Because implementation is 
essentially optional, neither states nor municipalities are expressly 
penalized for failure to implement decentralization goals.185 Yet, at the 
 
India, the federal government is “limited in the relationships it may establish with the local level and 
must seek to affect local behavior and outcomes through the states/provinces”). 
 179.  See THIRTEENTH FIN. COMM’N OF INDIA, supra note 48, at 159 (indicating that changes 
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TIMES INDIA (June 12, 2014), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Modi-strikes-non-partisan-note-
says-will-take-opposition-along/articleshow/36413945.cms (drawing attention to Modi’s recent use of 
the term cooperative federalism and explaining that Modi has been using this term to indicate that he 
wants the central government to forge a better working relationship with the states). 
 181.  TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 324 (emphasis added). 
 182.  Cabinet Secretariat Resolution, 2015, No. 511/2/1/2015 Gazette of India, pt. I sec. 1 (Jan. 1, 
2015); Manmohan Singh Faults Modi Govt for Abolishing Planning Commission, ECON. TIMES (June 9, 
2015), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/manmohan-singh-faults-modi-
govt-for-abolishing-planning-commission/articleshow/47600859.cms [hereinafter Singh Faults Modi]; 
NITI Aayog Website Likely to be up on Monday, ECON. TIMES (May 15, 2015), http://articles.economic 
times.indiatimes.com/2015-05-15/news/62192345_1_niti-aayog-the-aayog-transforming-india 
[hereinafter NITI Aayog]. 
 183.  GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 9–10. 
 184.  Id. at 22. 
 185.  Shatkin & Vidyarthi, supra note 22, at 10; see also S.N. Datye, Panchayati Raj in 
Maharashtra State, in DYNAMICS OF NEW PANCHAYATI RAJ SYSTEM IN INDIA: SELECT STATES 1, 26 
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same time, the lack of a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities also 
leads to confusion and, at times, interference by the state with what at least 
some commentators believe are urban affairs.186 There have also been calls 
to amend the Constitution to require state governments to vest power in 
local authorities and to expand the responsibilities of urban local bodies to 
make them commensurate with those of the rural local bodies.187 
Given this constitutional structure, the central government must work 
through the states to promote decentralization.188 Through the JnNURM, 
the central government incentivized compliance with the 74th CAA by 
promising funding for infrastructure and basic services.189 The scheme 
represents “the first time that the central government is providing 
assistance of this kind for what is classified as a State subject as per the 
Constitution.”190 
This analysis suggests that the potential for effective decentralization 
is limited by both India’s constitutional structure and by the language of the 
provisions authorized by the 74th CAA. Municipalities are not endowed 
with significant independent power; rather, they must wait for such power 
to be devolved to them by the states. As a result, states have been reluctant 
to devolve power to the local level out of fear that it will exacerbate their 
already subordinate position vis-à-vis the central government. Moreover, as 
detailed in the next two sections, states do not want to give power to 
municipalities that lack the capacity and the financial resources to 
effectively carry out the functions listed in the Twelfth Schedule of the 
Indian Constitution. In other words, the failure to decentralize 
 
(Ganapathy Palanithurai ed., 2002) (noting that despite the passage of the 73rd and 74th Amendments 
“even today Panchayats are not vested with power to initiate plan[s] at the district level”). 
 186.  GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 16 (also noting that 
infrequent elections have hampered the functioning of Indian municipalities); GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND 
ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 11–12 (“While there may be rationale for retention of 
some establishments of the State Government including that of the district administration at the local 
level, their functions and responsibilities should be confined to areas which are outside the jurisdiction 
of the local bodies. In respect of devolved functions, local government institutions should have 
autonomy and must be free of the State Governments’ bureaucratic control.”); Kennedy & Zerah, supra 
note 71, at 112 (noting that the role of the state government in urban affairs remains central). 
 187.  THIRTEENTH FIN. COMM’N OF INDIA, supra note 48, at 158; GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. 
REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at i. 
 188.  But see Bandyopadhyay et al., supra note 154, at 63 (observing that while Centrally 
Sponsored Schemes were historically implemented by the states, at this time, Rajiv Gandhi’s 
government began to bypass the states and reach out to state and local governments directly to help with 
the implementation of CSS). 
 189.   JNNURM OVERVIEW 3, supra note 74, at 3–4; see also Das, supra note 40, at 116 (“The 
JNNURM hinges on a carrot-and-stick approach, providing federal funds to select cities conditional 
upon their agreement to undertake governance reform to become efficient and self-sustaining.”). 
 190.  THORNTON, supra note 103, at 253. 
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administratively and fiscally negatively impacts the impetus for political 
decentralization; but many would argue that unless municipalities gain 
political authority over these functions, they will never have the 
administrative or financial mandate they need to succeed. 
B.  Administrative Decentralization 
This article argues that the poor capacity of municipalities to assume 
the functions identified in the 74th CAA and Twelfth Schedule has been a 
major stumbling block to achieving the goals of decentralization and the 
JnNURM.191 The limited administrative capacity of local bodies has not 
only hampered administrative decentralization, it has also discouraged 
states from transferring political and fiscal authority, creating a Catch-22 
situation. 
Local bodies have generally been unable to provide basic services to 
their populations.192 While the country arguably lacks capacity at all levels 
of government, this deficit is particularly acute at the local level.193 Most 
municipalities do not have the specialized and technical skills or staff to 
oversee the functions to be devolved.194 For example, a 2011 assessment 
found that most municipalities lack the ability to take over functions such 
as roads, bridges, water supply, sewerage, drainage and urban forestry.195 
The JnNURM sought to foster administrative decentralization by 
incentivizing reforms that promoted channels for greater participation in 
the planning process. For example, it encouraged the development of the 
 
 191.  GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 24 (“[T]he matters 
listed in the Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules could not be fully handled by the local governments even 
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 192.  GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 10. 
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 194.  THORNTON, supra note 103, at 266–69 (noting that municipalities need experts in law, project 
management, finance, social development, e-governance, public works, engineering, urban planning, 
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 195.  Id. at 258; see also ATAL MISSION, supra note 113, at 9 (noting that the Atal Mission for 
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Metropolitan Planning Committees and the District Planning 
Committees,196 as well as Metropolitan/City Development Commissions.197 
The scheme stressed the need for more robust and comprehensive planning 
that has at least a ten-year perspective. It also urged state and local 
authorities to reassess the boundaries of municipalities as peri-urban areas 
continue to grow.198 While certain provisions were complied with, such as 
the creation of three tiers of local government, many of the planning-
related committees have not yet been formed.199 
Capacity building has been described as the “single most important 
activity required in the today’s urban sector scenario.”200 The JnNURM 
promoted capacity building efforts by providing project funding tied to 
74th CAA reforms.201 To the extent that capacity building took place, it 
was short-term and generally limited to higher-level officials, such as the 
Mayor, while lower-level officials, such as the engineers responsible for 
implementation, were excluded.202 Funds earmarked for other trainings 
were not utilized because suitable staff members were not available.203 
Tensions have arisen because state-level agencies known as 
“parastatals” are often better equipped than municipalities to handle certain 
functions. This situation highlights a potential conflict between the goal of 
improving access to basic services and the devolution of power. 
Historically, many public services and city planning functions were 
performed by parastatals, such as development authorities, housing boards, 
slum development agencies, and water and sanitation boards, many of 
which were created in the 1970s and 1980s.204 These semi-autonomous 
 
 196.  Ahluwalia, supra note 108, at 51. 
 197.  TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 322–24; see also 
Sivaramakrishnan, supra note 37, at 105–30 (discussing district planning reforms). 
 198.  TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 327–28. 
 199.  NAT’L INST. OF URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 21, at vi (noting that “while there has been full 
compliance in respect of provisions, such as constitution of three types of ULBs, reservation of seats, 
and constitution of SFCs, the same cannot be said for other provisions, namely constitution of Wards 
Committees, District Planning Committees and Metropolitan Planning Committees”). 
 200.  THORNTON, supra note 103, at 257; see also GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS 
COMM’N, supra note 2, at 69 (noting that capacity building incorporates both organizational 
development and individual development). 
 201.  GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 68–69. 
 202.  Id. at 68; THORNTON, supra note 103, at 267. 
 203.  TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 334 (In recognizing these 
challenges, the Planning Commission recommended that the second phase of the JnNURM reserve 
approximately ten percent of its overall funds to a separate sub-mission for capacity building.);  
THORNTON, supra note 103, at 257. 
 204.  GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 9–10; THORNTON, 
supra note 103, at 256. 
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state agencies have specialized expertise.205 Sometimes described as 
agencies or public corporations, parastatals usually have a corporate 
structure similar to publicly traded private sector companies and a separate 
legal status from other public service providers.206 The “corporatization” of 
public services has been widely encouraged as an efficient way to manage 
the delivery of public services because it reduces the potential for political 
interference and heightens the role of technical experts.207 
Some parastatals may also be “ring-fenced,” meaning that that their 
budgets are managed separately from the rest of the municipality or state. 
This strategy, which was encouraged by the High Powered Expert 
Committee on Urban Infrastructure and the now-defunct Planning 
Commission of India208 (replaced with NITI Aayog by Prime Minister 
Modi in 2015209), is designed to “create greater financial transparency, 
reduce political interference, and strengthen managerial accountability 
within relatively autonomous service entities.”210 This administrative and 
political isolation also facilitates raising tariffs for user charges.211 
However, “ring-fencing” has also been critiqued because some public 
services should arguably be provided for the safety and health of the 
community, even though they may not be financially sustainable. Indeed, 
the strategy can make it more difficult to provide affordable services to the 
poor and marginalized by preventing cross-subsidization across different 
sectors.212 
 
 205.  GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 10; DAVID 
MCDONALD, RETHINKING CORPORATIZATION AND PUBLIC SERVICES IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH 1 (2014), 
http://www.municipalservicesproject.org/userfiles/McDonald_Chap1_Public_Ambiguity_and_the_Mult
iple_Meanings_of_Corporatization.pdf. 
 206.  MCDONALD, supra note 205, at 1. 
 207.  See Id. (“Water and electricity utilities are common examples, although the practice extends 
to a much wider range of goods and services, including airports, childcare, universities, forests, 
hospitals, transport and manufacturing.”). 
 208.  See HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 98 (providing support for the claim that ring-fencing 
and corporatization in general can lead to significant efficiency gains); TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - 
VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 333 (encouraging that proceeds accruing to ULBs be set up in a city 
development fund and “ring-fenced” off for other urban infrastructure projects and for shelter). 
 209.  Cabinet Secretariat Resolution, supra note 182, pt. I sec. 1; Singh Faults Modi, supra note 
182; NITI Aayog, supra note 182. 
 210.  MCDONALD, supra note 205, at 2. 
 211.  See TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 332 (encouraging the 
adoption of tariff structures that “not only cover O&M costs, debt servicing costs and depreciation, but 
also provide a minimal profit to the ULBs to facilitate creation of an equity base for ULBs over time”). 
 212.  See, e.g., DAVID A. MCDONALD, THE BELL TOLLS FOR THEE: COST RECOVERY, CUTOFFS, 
AND THE AFFORDABILITY OF MUNICIPAL SERVICES IN SOUTH AFRICA 7 (2002), ftp://healthlink.org.za/ 
pubs/localgov/ mspreport.pdf; Sharmila Murthy, The Human Right(s) to Water and Sanitation: History, 
Meaning and the Controversy over Privatization, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 89, 135 (2013). 
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The critical factor for the purposes of this analysis is that parastatals 
are state-level agencies that are often better positioned to provide services 
than city-level agencies. Yet, as K.C. Sivaramakrishnan argues, “It is 
conveniently forgotten that the functional domain of the [urban local 
bodies] have been steadily undermined by the state governments by setting 
up parastatals and diverting municipal functions and funds to them.”213 
The challenges of achieving administrative decentralization highlight 
an inherent conflict that was at the heart of the JnNURM: cities may not yet 
be in a position to improve infrastructure and basic services. In other 
words, realizing the 74th CAA’s goal of municipal empowerment requires 
a long-term commitment; but, in the interim, the devolution of power to 
cities could actually hinder the expansion of infrastructure and basic 
services. The JnNURM attempted to navigate this conflict and strike a 
balance by permitting the interim use of parastatals.214 In addition, many 
municipalities relied on external consultants to develop the various plans 
needed to seek and implement JnNURM project-funding. 
However, many have criticized such reliance on parastatals because it 
is perceived as detracting from the goal of municipal empowerment at the 
core of the 74th CAA.215 For example, one national government report on 
decentralization in India stated, “development authorities should be 
dissolved and their functions taken over by the local bodies in whose 
jurisdiction they operate.”216 The reliance on parastatals could reduce the 
potential for participatory decision-making by deferring to technical 
experts who are only indirectly accountable to the people.217 Many 
proponents of decentralization in India see the rise of these parastatal 
agencies as having a negative effect on local bodies, weakening them and 
facilitating their “atrophy.”218 There is an effort in some quarters of the 
 
 213.  SIVARAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 37, at 94–95. 
 214.  See id. at 94 (noting that the JnNURM “guidelines equate parastatal organizations with an 
elected local body”); TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 326 (seeing a role for 
parastatals in a variety of sectors including water supply, solid waste management, sewerage, sanitation, 
primary health services, primary education, roads and urban transport). 
 215.  TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 326; see also Chaubey, 
Federalism in India, supra note 16, at 5 (suggesting that given the constitutional and political emphasis 
on decentralization, the role of parastatals, such as state-level authorities, public corporations and other 
boards, is unclear). 
 216.  THIRTEENTH FIN. COMM’N OF INDIA, supra note 48, at 161, 182 (“It is desirable that all funds 
relating to local governments be routed through the local bodies and not through any statutory or non-
statutory body whose activities overlap with theirs. All such parallel bodies may be abolished so that 
funds flow directly to the local bodies through the State Governments.”). 
 217.  See HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 63 (noting that parastatals are also only indirectly 
accountable to ULBs). 
 218.  GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 10. 
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Indian government to reverse the “massive decline in the role and status of 
local bodies” that arose as a result of the parastatals.219 Even former Prime 
Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh urged state governments in 2007 to 
empower district level institutions, as opposed to state-level parastatals, to 
handle basic services like water supply.220 A seminal report by the Second 
Administrative Reforms Commission of the Government of India stated: 
 
[T]he parastatal bodies function totally independent from the local 
governments and are directly accountable to the State Government. 
Thus, the local governments are often divested of their important 
functions. Such proliferation of parastatals runs counter to the principle 
of subsidiarity and precludes effective citizens’ participation in the 
management of these services. The citizen is compelled to deal with a 
multiplicity of authorities to access even the basic amenities and 
services. The local functions of all these authorities therefore need to 
devolve on local governments. . . .221 
 
This critique of parastatals highlights the limits of the 74th CAA to 
India’s Constitution. As discussed supra, the 74th CAA did not mandate 
the devolution of power from states to local bodies. A municipality’s 
ability to take over administrative functions has impacted state decisions 
about whether to devolve power. The use of semi-autonomous agencies 
with discretion is a form of administrative decentralization often referred to 
as delegation.222 This was the type of decentralization promoted in the 
1970s and 1980s in India to improve public management. In contrast, the 
transfer of authority for decision-making, finance, and management to 
lower tiers of government is usually described as devolution.223 This type 
of administrative decentralization is usually the basis for political 
decentralization because it provides greater opportunity for citizens and 
their elected representatives to exert power over public decision-making.224 
The Modi administration is replacing the JnNURM with its own 
programs and it has already substituted the Planning Commission with the 
 
 219.  Id. at iii. 
 220.  See id. at 11 (“I therefore request State Governments to consider empowering district level 
institutional structures to handle the issue of water supply. This is also a constitutional obligation as 
water supply is one of the basic functions to be carried out by rural and urban local bodies as per the 
11th Schedule of our Constitution.”). 
 221.  Id. at 19. 
 222.  Administrative Decentralization, THE WORLD BANK GRP., http://www1.worldbank.org/public 
sector/decentralization/admin.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2015).  
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id. 
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NITI Aayog.225 Nevertheless, the Planning Commission’s 
recommendations for the next phase of the JnNURM are still worth 
considering because many of the central ideas remain, albeit re-
packaged.226 The tremendously overlapping responsibilities of state and 
city-level institutions in India have resulted in a “mazelike structure of 
management and accountability.”227 The former Planning Commission 
stressed the need for greater deliberative processes at the local level to 
institutionalize participatory and accountability mechanisms.228 It also 
suggested a stronger harmonization of parastatals with the elected 
municipal bodies by encouraging the two bodies to enter into suitable 
memoranda of understanding, with clearly specified and mutually agreed 
upon parameters and deliverables.229 This type of arrangement is likely 
preferable to giving the municipalities responsibility at the eleventh hour, 
especially since the service delivery capacities of municipalities are not 
always identified before powers are devolved.230 This approach would also 
enable cities to tap into the technical expertise of parastatals, which have a 
degree of operational autonomy, while simultaneously ensuring a degree of 
public accountability.231 Another option is for local bodies to maintain a 
common pool of such expertise that could be accessed on demand and by 
payment.232 By providing more accountability to elected municipal 
officials, this type of arrangement would at least help achieve the spirit of 
the 74th CAA reforms.233 
 
 225.  Singh Faults Modi, supra note 182; NITI Aayog, supra note 182. 
 226.  See TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 28, 325 (citing reforms of the 
High Powered Expert Committee for Urban Infrastructure); HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 94 (noting 
that the JnNURM is administered by both the Ministry of Urban Development and the Ministry of 
Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, and that the merger of these two ministries is “a prerequisite 
for taking the agenda of better urban governance forward”). 
 227.  TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 324; see also THORNTON, supra 
note 103, at 258 (noting instances under the JnNURM where new housing construction was not tied to 
infrastructure or basic service delivery); HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 63 (drawing attention to the 
tortuous accountability system that exists in the field of urban transport). 
 228.  TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 326. 
 229.  See THORNTON, supra note 103, at 266 (“For the devolution of functions under 74th CAA, 
there should be a tripartite agreement between the ULB and parastatal agency to make the ULB 
accountable for the city functions.”). 
 230.  Id. at 257 (noting how “using the structure followed by states like Orissa, [memoranda of 
agreement] should be signed with the parastatal agencies to permit them to implement the projects with 
them being accountable to the ULB for the same”). 
 231.  HPEC REPORT, supra note 47, at 63 (noting that currently “the accountability of parastatals is 
to state government and not to ULBs and thus the latter have little control over the parastatals”); 
TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN - VOLUME II, supra note 103, at 325–26; World Bank, supra note 191, at 2. 
 232.  GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 72. 
 233.  Id. at 30–31 (suggesting that the creation of district councils should be accompanied by a 
change in the responsibilities of the district collector who would be in charge of a wide range of duties 
 120 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol. 26:79 
Any new urban renewal program in India should also be mindful of 
the challenges that JnNURM faced. The JnNURM required six mandatory 
reforms at the state level and seven reforms at the municipal level. It also 
included another ten optional reforms. Failure to achieve these reforms 
impacted funding for projects and, in some instances, led to cost-overruns 
and delays.234 But weak initial capacity prevented states from devolving 
power and implementing the reforms in the first place. Thus, before 
requiring that certain powers necessarily be devolved from the state to the 
city level, the central government should consider having consultations 
with the states about what is feasible.235 As part of this process, the capacity 
of the municipalities needs to be assessed. If a city is not yet prepared to 
assume full responsibility, then the state ought to prioritize ensuring that 
municipalities are engaged in the process by which parastatal agencies 
deliver services to citizens. 236 
Effective forms of political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization 
are intimately interrelated. If municipalities lack the capacity to take up 
functions envisioned under the 74th CAA, there is reluctance for states to 
devolve power to them. A municipality’s financial position is weakened 
when it is not able to accrue land-based revenues and financing options that 
otherwise go to development authorities and parastatals.237 But 
municipalities may not be motivated to assume these functions unless 
appropriate power and finances are available.238 A 2011 evaluation of the 
JnNURM found that because capacity-building funds were under-utilized 
during the six year project-span, it was untenable for states to blame 
municipalities for their lack of capacity.239 
In some cases, the states may actually work to keep urban local 
government from functioning efficiently. Typically, the state government 
assesses the number of people from the backward castes that live in 
different districts.240 This number is important because it influences how 
many seats in the local government will be reserved for members of the 
 
that extend from land acquisition and assessment to maintenance of law and order in both rural and 
urban areas of a particular district); THORNTON, supra note 103, at 267. 
 234.  THORNTON, supra note 103, at 256. 
 235.  Id. at 261. 
 236.  JNNURM OVERVIEW 3, supra note 74, at 12. 
 237.  THIRTEENTH FIN. COMM’N OF INDIA, supra note 48, at 171–72. 
 238.  GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 81. 
 239.  THORNTON, supra note 103, at 259. 
 240.  GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 34. 
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backward castes. In many cases, states have not shared this information, 
rendering it impossible for local governments to hold elections.241 
Another impediment to effective administrative decentralization is the 
lack of coordination between urban and rural governments. This disconnect 
is partly attributable to the fact that a system of rural local governance was 
created before a system of urban governance.242 In addition, the rise of new 
peri-urban areas has made it harder to distinguish areas as clearly urban or 
rural.243 States have also found it difficult to devolve planning powers to 
local governments when the planning area is larger than city limits. For 
example, a planning district could cover several municipalities and/or rural 
areas.244 Better coordination between urban and rural local governments is 
needed because of the expanding peri-urban landscape.245 
The 74th CAA paved the way for political decentralization, but placed 
significant discretion at the state level. If municipalities are not 
administratively capable, then states will have even less incentive to 
devolve powers to them. The capacity of municipalities to take on 
increased responsibilities is further impacted by the constitutional 
limitations on fiscal decentralization, which is discussed next. 
C.  Fiscal Decentralization 
The highly centralized nature of India’s fiscal federal system 
complicates the goal of improving municipal financial capacity. This article 
suggests that fiscal decentralization has not occurred because 
municipalities do not have the resources to effectively implement newly 
devolved powers. Consistent with a fiscal federal structure, municipalities 
have long depended on resources allocated by the national and state 
governments. Indeed, the JnNURM was a national program that tied 
financial support to reforms at the state and local levels, an illustration of 
the centralized manner in which decentralization has been pursued in India. 
Encouraging cities to diversify their own funding bases and tap into new 
revenue sources is not only administratively challenging, but also 
contradicts the theoretical efficiency of a fiscal federal system. 
 
 241.  See id. at 35–36 (suggesting that the State Election Commissions be given the power to 
determine the reservation of seats in local government elections). 
 242.  Id. at 30–31. 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  THORNTON, supra note 103, at 256. 
 245.  See GOV’T OF INDIA SECOND ADMIN. REFORMS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 30; NAT’L INST. OF 
URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 92, at ix (noting a challenge in that municipalities must often develop 
plans in an “institutional vacuum” because the district-level or metropolitan level plans are not prepared 
properly, which reduces the availability of regional and district information). 
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1. India’s Fiscal Federal Structure is Highly Centralized 
Fiscal federalism is, at its roots, a theory about how fiscal powers 
should be divided between multiple levels of government in order to 
promote allocative efficiency and productive efficiency. This theory holds 
that the central government should be in charge of macroeconomic 
stabilization, income redistribution, and the provision of certain “national” 
public goods. In contrast, subnational governments should be responsible 
for the provision of local public goods and services.246 The centralized 
collection of resources through taxes and decentralized expenditures is 
intended to promote allocative efficiency.247 As a result, each level of 
government leverages its own comparative advantage and each subnational 
actor determines which services deserve the highest priority. 
By design, India’s constitutional structure features a “vertical 
mismatch,”248 also known as a “non-correspondence” problem,249 in that 
the resources collected by the central government far exceed the tasks 
assigned to it.250 Fiscal transfers are required to correct vertical imbalances 
between different tiers of government.251 This intentional mismatch 
between resource generation and expenditure reflects the idea that many 
taxes are more efficiently collected by a higher tier of government.252 
Expenditures are decentralized to improve efficiency because lower levels 
of government are theoretically better informed.253 The fact that that the 
resources collected by the central government surpass the tasks assigned to 
it is not inherently problematic. Rather, mechanisms for remedying this 
asymmetrical taxation are theoretically built into the federal system. It is 
only when these mechanisms break down that issues arise. 
 
 246.  See Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1120, 1120–30 (1999) 
(noting the presumption of the decentralized provision of public goods with localized efforts). 
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 248.  Chaubey, Union-State Fiscal Relations, supra note 15, at 22. 
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 253.  AGARWAL, supra note 15, at 15; Andres Rodriguez-Pose & Nicolas Gill, The Global Trend 
Towards Devolution and Its Implications, 21 ENV’T. & PLAN. 333 (2003) (discussing the efficiency 
advantages lower level governance can engender). 
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India has utilized two primary mechanisms for remedying 
intentionally asymmetrical taxing and spending between the central and 
state governments.254 First are transfers to the states via the Finance 
Commission, a unique institution without a parallel in other federal 
countries.255 Convened every five years, the Finance Commission makes 
recommendations about collected taxes and duties, which it is 
constitutionally required to divide between the central government and 
states.256 The share of proceeds of central taxes to be divided between the 
Center and the states is known as vertical distribution, while the share to be 
divided between the states is known as horizontal distribution.257 Plan 
transfers by the Planning Commission were the second mechanism for 
transferring funds to the states,258 but as noted earlier, this institution has 
since been dissolved.259 The Planning Commission was established as a 
permanent body in 1950 and played a critical role in developing schemes 
when India’s public sector played a large role in the economy.260 The 
Planning Commission was considered “extra-constitutional” because it was 
not explicitly referenced in the Constitution.261 Rather, its power derived 
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from Article 282 of the Constitution, which enabled it to provide grants for 
any public purpose.262 Additionally, the Planning Commission’s five-year 
plans usually provided for discretionary transfers via central schemes, such 
as the JnNURM, which were managed by union ministries.263 
Approximately two-thirds of resources had been transferred via the Finance 
Commission and one-third had been transferred through the Planning 
Commission.264 As discussed below, states were then responsible for 
disbursing funds to the local level. Given the current functions of the NITI 
Aayog,265 it is not yet clear what role it will play in allocation of resources 
to the states. 
India’s fiscal federal system has been complicated by a perceived 
duplication of effort between the Finance Commission and the Planning 
Commission. The Finance Commission was initially envisioned to be the 
chief, or exclusive, mechanism for transferring funds between the central 
and state governments through a process intended to be free of political 
interference.266 The Planning Commission gained increasing power because 
of its ability to target funding to projects deemed important by the Center. 
This power made the Planning Commission the “unintended channel” for 
transferring resources, leading to a perception that it was dominant.267 
Given the duplication of effort between the Finance Commission and 
the Planning Commission, it was suggested that the two institutions 
merge.268 Soon after taking office, Prime Minister Modi indicated that he 
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would replace the Planning Commission with a new organization.269 While 
the proposed institution was originally supposed to be called the National 
Development Reforms Commission (NDRC),270 it ultimately became the 
NITI Aayog. As the Cabinet Resolution creating the NITI Aayog notes, the 
rise of “market forces and larger global shifts” means that there is also a 
“diminished role of centralised [sic] planning.” 271 As this article was going 
to press, the future of the NITI Aayog remained unclear. 
While a fiscal federal structure is intended to be centralized with 
respect to collection, India’s approach historically limited the extent to 
which expenditures could be decentralized. For over 50 years, India’s 
constitutional structure only allowed certain resources to be shared with the 
states, which reinforced the centralized nature of India’s federal model. 
This approach was also at odds with the theory of federalism.272 In 2000, 
India’s Constitution was changed through the 80th Amendment so that all 
taxes and duties collected by the union could be shared with the states.273 
Yet even under the revised provisions, certain revenues must be shared 
with the states and others may be shared.274 
An appropriately designed fiscal federalism system requires both 
adequate resources to discharge responsibilities, as well as elasticity of 
resources to meet preferences and needs. Yet, this economic theory needs 
to mesh with the political reality in India. While the states are equal as a 
matter of law, in many respects, they are politically in a subordinate 
position because they depend on the Center for funding.275 The central 
government’s ability to call “President’s Rule” also reinforces the inferior 
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position of the states.276 The states’ ability to borrow from the market is 
also limited, which only heightens this dependence.277 In reality, 
discretionary control of resources by the Center combined with the 
decentralized expenditure by the states has also contributed to fiscal 
irresponsibility at the state level.278 While the fiscal federal model calls for 
the decentralization of expenditures, the subordinate position of the states, 
strong centralizing tendencies in India, and concerns about fiscal 
irresponsibility have limited the extent to which this is possible. 
The relationship between the Center and the states mirrors that 
between the states and municipalities. The Central Finance Commission 
(CFC) requires the fair and equitable transfer of resources from the Center 
to the states,279 and the 74th CAA established a similar arrangement 
between the states and local bodies through the creation of State Finance 
Commissions (SFC).280 As constitutionally created bodies, the SFCs enable 
the state governments to devolve funds to local bodies and to authorize 
local bodies to impose taxes and duties.281 Every five years, the SFCs are 
required to review the financial positions of the municipalities.282 Just as 
the CFC makes recommendations about how funds should be divided 
between the Center and the states, the SFCs are required to make 
recommendations as to how funds should be split between the states and 
local bodies.283 
While the 74th CAA outlined eighteen functions that states may 
devolve to the municipalities,284 as set forth in the Twelfth Schedule, it did 
not provide a corresponding “municipal finance list.” Rather, states have 
discretion to assign finances to municipalities “by law.” Although states are 
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limited in the taxes that they can collect, those for which they have 
responsibility can also be assigned to local governments. These include 
property taxes, vehicle taxes, professional taxes, and octroi, to the extent 
this last category still exists.285 As a result, the constitution reinforces a 
structure whereby states are highly dependent on the central government, 
and in turn, the municipalities are highly dependent on the states.286 
2. Numerous Barriers Exist to Municipal Fiscal Empowerment 
Despite the breadth of functions that are to be devolved to 
municipalities, a commensurate amount of resources has not also been 
devolved.287 Local bodies across India require financial support to provide 
core services, such as drinking water, sewerage, solid waste management, 
and street lights, and to provide for operational infrastructure and 
staffing.288 Their lack of funding is a key reason for the poor operation and 
maintenance of urban infrastructure and inadequate service delivery. 
The JnNURM sought to improve access to funding for municipal 
infrastructure and delivery of basic services by incentivizing reforms at the 
local and state level designed to promote the 74th CAA.289 The JnNURM 
fiscal reforms were broadly focused on three areas. The first area was the 
development of more effective SFCs in order to reduce delays in the 
transfer of funds to municipalities. The second area involved increasing the 
revenue base through improved taxation and user charges for public 
services, such as water supply. The third area entailed private sector 
participation in the delivery of public services.290 Each of these is discussed 
in turn. 
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a. State Finance Commissions (SFCs) 
State Finance Commissions often do not function properly, which 
negatively impacts the financial revenues of a municipality.291 The quality 
of SFC reports is inconsistent, due in part to the lack of data from urban 
and local bodies, limited capacity, and lack of ownership by state 
governments.292 The Central Finance Commission has recommended that 
SFC reports follow a uniform template and adopt reporting periods that are 
synchronous with the CFC reports.293 SFCs are urged to conduct more 
thorough analyses of the municipalities’ finances to make 
recommendations regarding the efficiency of tax collection, expenditures, 
operational efficiencies, and other related issues.294 With the goal of 
incentivizing the delivery of quality public services, the CFC has also 
recommended that SFCs consider linking the devolution of funds to the 
level/quality of civic amenities that the citizens could expect.295 SFCs are 
also encouraged to produce reports that are more consistent, thorough, and 
transparent. 
Even where SFCs are functioning well, state governments often do not 
follow their recommendations and, as a result, do not commit adequate 
resources to local governments.296 In contrast, the central government of 
India generally accepts the recommendations of the CFC, even though they 
are not mandatory.297 When states do not implement the recommendations 
of SFCs,298 the transmission of funds to local bodies is delayed despite the 
fact that states have to pay interest to the local bodies.299 Resultantly, many 
municipalities have unpredictable funds transfers from state 
governments,300 which compromise their ability to discharge their 
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responsibilities.301 The reluctance of states to follow the recommendations 
of SFCs that are working well is yet another barrier to improvements in 
municipal finance in India.302 
b. Expanding Revenue Base 
Local bodies in India suffer from a lack of an independent tax base.303 
The sources of municipal revenues in India—taxes, user charges and fees, 
transfers, and loans—are relatively narrow compared to international 
benchmarks and other federal countries like the United States, Canada, 
Brazil, and China.304 For example, while local government revenues in the 
U.S. accounted for fifteen percent of total government revenues in 2001, 
the figure in India was only three percent.305 There are four ways for Indian 
local bodies to try to expand their revenue base, but each strategy faces 
challenges. 
First, municipalities can persuade state governments to devolve more 
sources of revenue down to them. Even though the urban population in 
India is growing faster than the national rate, municipalities are 
increasingly dependent on the Center and states for financial resources.306 
However, the states have been historically reluctant to share any financial 
resources with local bodies, which stems in part from the lack of 
administrative capacity (as discussed in Section III.B) and in part from 
their sense of marginalization by the central government (as discussed in 
Section III.A).307 Ironically, the inability of municipalities to generate 
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matching funds has, at times, impeded their ability to participate in many 
central government schemes.308 
Second, local bodies can try to raise new sources of tax revenue.309 
Such a strategy may be politically difficult, however, as many have 
expressed an aversion to introducing new taxes until the current tax 
administration system is improved. In India, tax evasion is widespread at 
the national, state and local level.310 For example, in 2012, the Chief of 
India’s Central Bureau of Investigation reported that over 500 billion 
dollars have been illegally deposited in overseas tax havens.311 Until 
citizens have faith in the government’s ability to ensure compliance with 
existing tax measures, it will be difficult to secure public support for new 
tax measures at any level of government. 
Third, local bodies can improve the efficiency and utilization of 
existing revenue collection mechanisms. Property tax is the most important 
source of revenue for local governments312 because land is a municipality’s 
biggest asset.313 However, only approximately sixty to seventy percent of 
most urban properties in India are taxed. Unsatisfactory records of property 
title, urban sprawl that expands municipal boundaries, unauthorized 
construction, and corruption all complicate the collection of property 
taxes.314 Unintentional conflicts arise with state agencies as well. For 
example, if a state-level parastatal agency develops an area, then it may not 
be handed over to a municipal body for some time, preventing the 
collection of local taxes.315 In order for there to be an improvement in 
property tax collection, these urban management issues need to be 
addressed. 
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Fourth and finally, local bodies can try to mobilize non-tax sources of 
revenue by charging user fees for the provision of public services, such as 
water and sewerage.316 User fees for municipal services are difficult to 
implement because they require a level of political acceptance and 
consensus.317 Unclear land tenure, for example in slums, may prevent a 
municipality from installing service connections, even when residents may 
be willing to pay for such connections.318 User fees set at rates too high to 
be affordable may also impose public health costs and create human rights 
consequences. While the imposition of user fees may represent a significant 
opportunity for municipalities looking to expand their revenue base, the 
potential for these fees to further marginalize the urban poor or pose public 
health risks needs to be carefully considered. 
c. Private Sector Participation (Market-Based Decentralization) 
Indian municipalities are increasingly turning to the private sector to 
fund infrastructure improvements and the delivery of basic services.319 The 
term market-based decentralization is used to identify situations in which 
decentralization is associated with the transfer of responsibilities not to 
lower levels of government, but to private companies. There are two ways 
that private companies are becoming involved in urban infrastructure 
financing: they are working with local governments to provide services for 
a certain percentage of the revenue (public-private partnerships), and they 
are lending money to municipal governments, for example in the form of 
municipal bonds. 
The JnNURM also embraced market-based decentralization by 
encouraging ULBs to borrow from capital markets and engage in public 
private partnerships (PPPs). The JnNURM was the first major scheme of 
the government of India that fostered PPPs in urban sectors such as solid 
waste, water supply, sewage, and urban transport. The JnNURM helped 
facilitate municipal borrowing from capital markets by working with four 
major credit agencies to make sure the JnNURM cities all had credit 
ratings.320 The newly formed NITI Aayog will also likely embrace a greater 
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role for the private sector. Indeed, the Cabinet Resolution that created the 
NITI Aayog states that “[i]n the past, governance may have been rather 
narrowly construed as public governance. In today’s changed dynamics – 
with ‘public’ services often being delivered by ‘private’ entities, and the 
greater scope for ‘participative citizenry’, governance encompasses and 
involves everyone.”321 
The direct borrowing model for private sector investment and the PPP 
model have both had limited success in India so far. One form of direct 
borrowing—municipal bonds—was believed to be an especially promising 
way to finance urban infrastructure.322 Municipal bonds were seen as 
particularly attractive because of their greater borrowing potential323 and 
longer maturity periods.324 While over twenty municipal bonds were issued 
in the late 1990s and 2000s,325 there have been no municipal bonds issued 
since 2010. This recent stagnation of the municipal bond market has been 
attributed to low municipal credit scores and the lack of a sound regulatory 
framework. However, there are a number of indications that India is 
looking to revive its municipal bond market. In January 2014, India’s 
capital regulator announced the creation of a “twenty-odd” person 
committee that will make recommendations about how to facilitate the 
development of the municipal bond market.326 In July 2014, India’s 
Finance Minister announced a ten-fold increase in funds for an 
organization dedicated to improving municipal credit scores and 
infrastructure projects.327 There have also been suggestions that municipal 
bonds may be used, at least in part, to fund Modi’s “Smart Cities” plan.328 
The recently released guidelines indicate that Modi’s new urban renewal 
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scheme, AMRUT, will also try to increase the availability of municipal 
bonds.329 
As with municipal bonds, the extent to which PPPs will be used to 
finance urban infrastructure is unclear.330 One large concern about PPPs is 
the potential for collusion between companies and bureaucrats. This 
concern has prompted some, including recent Nobel Prize winner Jean 
Tirole, to argue for independent evaluation of PPP contracts.331 Another 
potential way to prevent collusion between public and private partners is to 
allow the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India to audit public-
private partnerships. In August 2014, the CAG asked the government for 
this authority.332 If these concerns about collusion can be addressed, PPPs 
could be a very important source of urban infrastructure financing.333 The 
Planning Commission, which has since been replaced with NITI Aayog, 
estimated that between thirteen and twenty-three percent of urban sector 
investments could potentially be made using the PPP model.334 The authors 
of the Twelfth Year Plan obviously envisioned a future for the PPP model 
seeing as they used it as the basis for their new experiment in melding the 
language of political and market-based decentralization. 
The Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012–2017) also called for an extended 
“4P” framework—People–Private–Public–Partnerships. Experience across 
the world indicates that in urban renewal and management, the role of 
people in the design of projects and partnerships is more crucial than in 
large infrastructure projects such as highways, airports, power plants.335 
India’s new Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, has also embraced the PPPP 
model, as illustrated by a recent blog post on his website.336 In fact, the 
guidelines of Modi’s new urban renewal scheme, AMRUT, state the 
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government’s intention to use the PPPP model to finance the upkeep of 
parks, playgrounds, and other recreational areas.337 
When India’s “Smart Cities” plan goes into effect, the role played by 
the private sector will increase. The plan’s draft concept note states that a 
city covered under the plan “must be able to attract investments and funds 
from private players,”338 including from municipal bonds and PPPs. More 
specifically, the plan recommends that creditworthy local governments 
issue tax-free municipal bonds and deploy PPPs as a means of leveraging 
private sector financing.339 India’s Urban Development Minister recently 
remarked that “the key to building smart cities is private investments.”340 
India is in the midst of an important shift in the financing of urban 
infrastructure;341 less than a decade ago, the private sector played a much 
smaller role. The JnNURM encouraged the use of two forms of market-
based financing: PPPs and municipal bonds. Although each financing 
mechanism comes with its own set of challenges, both mechanisms are still 
believed to offer some promise. While the JnNURM will soon be phased 
out, private sector investment will likely continue to play a large role in 
urban financing under Modi’s “Smart Cities” plan.342 
3. Greater Coordination is Needed 
The inadequate administrative capacity of municipalities combined 
with the poor functioning of the SFCs has meant that municipalities are not 
in a position to discharge their increased responsibilities. It should thus 
come as no surprise that a recent evaluation of the JnNURM stated that 
while the scheme “has brought about a change in the mindset of the States’ 
and the ULBs’ [urban local bodies] to focus more on strengthening their 
financial and technical capabilities, there is still a long way to go before 
they will be in a position to reduce their dependence on funding via grants 
from the Central and/or State Government.”343 
Fiscal decentralization in India is plagued by the reality that without 
an effective means for remedying the “vertical mismatch,” it is challenging 
to implement fiscal federalism. The irony is that this push towards 
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expanding the municipal resource base contradicts the basic premise of the 
supposed allocative efficiency of fiscal federalism. An assumption implicit 
in this theory is that functions discharged at the local level can be financed 
by higher levels of government.344 Indeed, the theory of public finance 
indicates that the central government of India is better positioned to address 
re-distribution challenges through centralized revenue collection followed 
by inter-governmental transfers. However, a report prepared by the 
research arm of the Reserve Bank of India has observed that “there is no 
appropriate model of inter-governmental finance for local bodies in India to 
tackle the colossal problem of urban poverty.”345 In other words, the theory 
of fiscal federalism that drove India’s centralized system of tax collection 
will not work unless there are adequate policy mechanisms to enable the 
lowest tiers of government to spend the collected revenue. Greater 
consultation and partnership across all levels of government in India is 
needed to fulfill the promise of cooperative federalism.346 
Although the 74th CAA and the municipal reforms promoted by the 
JnNURM sought to empower municipalities, these local bodies do not have 
significant independent power and have simply implemented central and 
state government schemes.347 Persistent resource constraints impede the 
states’ ability to allocate sufficient resources down to the municipalities.348 
Because the states are unable to adequately provide for local governments, 
the Center increasingly has an “indirect stamp” on urban affairs through 
schemes like the JnNURM.349 Given the detailed instructions in the 
Twelfth Five Year Plan on urban planning and renewal, an irony is 
apparent: India has taken a highly centralized approach to creating 
decentralization. Indeed, the JnNURM was criticized for the dominant role 
of the Center vis-à-vis the states and for inadequate focus on the political 
processes needed to strengthen municipalities.350 
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The 74th CAA envisioned that municipalities would be more 
financially robust and that their long-term sustainability would depend on 
greater financial authority.351 But decentralization is not fiscally neutral. 
Rather, it entails an additional burden on the states, requiring additional 
financing to achieve higher levels of service delivery and staffing.352 For 
example, certain powers, such as accounting and using GIS to improve 
property taxation, require an investment in technical skills and equipment, 
which were not funded under the JnNURM.353 Moreover, fiscal 
decentralization also requires a certain degree of flexibility through untied 
resources. The inherent asymmetry in a fiscal federalism system requires 
that local authorities be able to establish priorities, create new schemes, and 
allocate funds.354 While funding under the JnNURM was earmarked for 
infrastructure development and basic services, there has not been a similar 
earmarking of funding to assist with devolution of power. 
Calls to restructure the system of municipal finances in the country 
have been made.355 Various studies commissioned by India’s central 
government have urged that the Constitution be amended to specifically 
create a “Local Bodies Finance List”356 or a “Municipal Finance 
Schedule.”357 It has also been suggested that a “special purpose vehicle” be 
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created by the national government to release funds directly to 
municipalities, thereby bypassing the state.358 However, it may not be 
practicable to amend the Constitution to create a separate tax domain for 
local governments.359 Municipalities do not have the capacity to collect 
such taxes, and these proposed changes may have an adverse impact on the 
financing of State Plans.360 The need for greater cooperative federalism is 
clear. 
There is need for improvement in the relations between all branches of 
India’s government. Of particular importance, however, is the relationship 
between the federal government and the states. This analysis highlights the 
extent to which the federal government’s efforts at decentralization have 
been stymied by state government reluctance to devolve power. A greater 
effort needs to be made by the federal government to assess whether this 
reluctance is related to a lack of capacity at the municipal level. The federal 
government should work with the states to identify powers that could be 
feasibly devolved to municipalities. The federal government should also 
counsel states on the importance of pursuing fiscal and political 
decentralization together. If power is devolved before financing, the local 
government will not be able to exercise its functions appropriately. If 
financing is devolved before power, then municipalities may simply 
become more wasteful in their spending. In order to achieve effective 
decentralization and cooperative federalism, greater consultation between 
the federal and state governments is necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
Cities are increasingly important actors in the global economy. 
Projected to have the fastest rate of urban growth, India presents a 
fascinating case study for understanding how the constitutional fabric in 
which cities are embedded influences their capacity to be autonomous legal 
actors. Moreover, with the landslide 2014 election of Prime Minister Modi, 
India is now poised to launch a series of new urban renewal schemes and 
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has already secured support from the U.S. for its “Smart Cities” program. 
Now is a critical time for understanding the lessons of prior efforts to 
promote decentralization and urban renewal. 
Through the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, India paved the way 
for a dramatic shift in power to urban local bodies. Decentralization 
presented an opportunity to enhance grassroots democracy by bringing 
power closer to the people and to improve urban areas through allocative 
efficiency gains. Although the 74th CAA was enacted in 1992, it was not 
until 2005 that the government of India began to meaningfully implement it 
through the JnNURM. This national urban renewal scheme represented a 
historic policy shift because it tied urban infrastructure and service delivery 
improvements to decentralization-oriented governance reforms at the state 
and local levels. Yet many of the expected gains did not materialize. This 
article argues that this failure is due in large part to India’s constitutional 
structure and to the way that decentralization under the 74th CAA has been 
pursued. 
Decentralization has not yet been successful in India for three key 
reasons. First, decentralization has only been partially implemented: the 
language of the constitutional amendment has hindered effective political 
decentralization, the comparative advantage of parastatal agencies has 
made administrative decentralization difficult, and the devolution of 
responsibility—but not revenue—to municipalities has hampered fiscal 
decentralization. 
Second, the analysis has revealed an irony: it has taken a highly 
centralized policy like the JnNURM to motivate devolution of power from 
states to local bodies under the 74th CAA. But this top-down approach has 
reduced the importance of local decision-making, thereby mitigating the 
allocative efficiency gains of decentralization. For example, the JnNURM 
tied funding to mandated reforms at the state and local levels, inadvertently 
exacerbating relations with the states. 
The third factor has been the relative weakness of local governance 
structures, which has created a Catch-22 situation. Without the necessary 
administrative capacity and financial resources, states are not going to 
devolve political power to municipalities. Investing in cities may require 
slowing down the decentralization process in the short-run by providing 
city managers with the skills and training necessary for meaningful 
involvement in the planning process, as opposed to rubber-stamping 
projects. This might mean that projects come to fruition more slowly, but it 
could mean better-run projects in the long-run. Improving the capacity of 
local governments is a key step to ensuring greater political, administrative, 
and fiscal decentralization. 
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In order for decentralization to succeed in India, more effort needs to 
be directed towards developing an effective model of cooperative 
federalism. The central government does not have a direct relationship with 
local bodies: it must work through the states. As a result, it needs to 
collaborate with the states to identify which powers could be feasibly 
devolved to municipalities and to develop solutions for perceived barriers 
to that devolution. Under India’s constitutional structure, the central 
government will only be able to achieve the vision of decentralization 
embodied in the 74th CAA if the states are willing partners in the endeavor. 
 
